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DML8/23/2005
me claims was Sanders County. Liang, 8. He relied on Wentz in support of his argument that, where two or more claims are joined in a single action and venue for the claims is proper in different counties, the plaintiff may choose any county which is proper for any claim and the defendant is not entitled to a change of venue. Liang, 9. The defendants argued, in part, that they were entitled to a change of venue pursuant to § 25-2-116, MCA, because the only proper place for trial of the wage claims relating to the Sanders County restaurant was Sanders County. Liang, 18. We noted our previous discussion in Wentz that the statute was enacted to prevent plaintiffs from raising spurious claims as a means to deny a defendant a favorable venue, and determined that § 25-2-116, MCA, did not apply to the case because the record did not indicate--and the defendants did not allege--that the plaintiff was attempting to manipulate venue in such a manner. Liang, 19.
Because it is my view that Wentz incorrectly interpreted and applied § 25-2-116, MCA, I disagree with Liang to the extent it relies on that case. Furthermore, Liang fails to note the distinction between application of §§ 25-2-115 and -116, MCA, as discussed earlier.
In summary, applying a straightforward interpretation and application of the venue statutes to the facts of this case, I concur in the outcome the Court reaches in affirming the District Court's grant of the motion to change venue made by the Fulbrights/Junga Juice. I do not agree with the Court's discussion of Wentz and Liang or the substance of those decisions. I would overrule Wentz and Liang, at least in part, and clarify any remaining portions.
KARLA M. GRAY
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