Winslow v. Montana Rail Link9/6/2005
Mont. 290, 29, 104 P.3d 1080, 29. Thus, we apply the same Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., criteria as applied by the district court. Peyatt v. Moore, 2004 MT 341, 13, 324 Mont. 249, 13, 102 P.3d 535, 13. Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Watkins Trust v. Lacosta, 2004 MT 144, 16, 321 Mont. 432, 16, 92 P.3d 620, 16 (citing Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.).
A judgment as a matter of law entered pursuant to Rule 50(b), M.R.Civ.P., may be granted only when it appears, as a matter of law, that a party could not prevail upon any view of the evidence. Massee v. Thompson, 2004 MT 121, 25, 321 Mont. 210, 25, 90 P.3d 394, 25. Motions for judgment as a matter of law are proper only when there is a complete absence of evidence to warrant submission to a jury. Kneeland v. Luzenac Am. Inc., 1998 MT 136, 53, 289 Mont. 201, 53, 961 P.2d 725, 53.
Prejudice is never presumed on appeal, and a judgment will not be reversed merely because the lower court erred. In order to reverse, it must affirmatively appear that the error has affected substantial rights of the defendant regarding the merits of the case. State v. DeTienne (1985), 218 Mont. 249, 257, 707 P.2d 534, 539.
This Court generally will defer to the decision of a trial court regarding sanctions for failure to comply with discovery procedures because the trial court is in the best position to know whether parties are disregarding the rights of opposing parties in the course of litigation. Lewistown Propane Co., v. Moncur, 2002 MT 349, 22, 313 Mont. 368, 22, 61 P.3d 780, 22. We review discretionary district court rulings for abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Werner Enter., Inc., 1998 MT 333, 13, 292 Mont. 284, 13, 972 P.2d 806, 13. Moreover, the party assigning error to the trial court's discovery rulings must show prejudice. Anderson, 13.
DISCUSSION
Did the District Court err in denying MRL's summary judgment and Rule 50(b) motions by incorrectly concluding that § 39-2-703, MCA, provides Winslow with a statutory cause of action?
On cross-appeal, MRL argues that § 39-2-703, MCA, does not provide Winslow with a statutory "mismanagement" cause of action. MRL explains that this Court concluded, upon rehearing in Dillon v. Great N. Ry. (1909), 38 Mont. 485, 100 P. 960, that:
Upon further consideration . . . we think there is not any room for doubt that in enacting sections 5251 and 5252, Rev. Codes [later codified as § 39-2-703, MCA], the Legislature did not intend to create any new right of action, but merely recognized a right of action existing at common law and sought to make that right available, notwithstanding the negligence of a fellow servant. Dillon, 38 Mont. at 504, 100 P. at 966. MRL explains that the Legislature did not recognize, let alone codify, a common-law action for mismanagement of employee terminations. MRL argues that Winslow I did not precisely consider whether § 39-2-703(1), MCA, provides plaintiffs with a statutory cause of action, but merely "assumed" that it did, and, consequently, Winslow I, in contrast to Dillon, cannot be considered stare decisis on this issue.
We reasoned in Winslow I that § 39-2-703, MCA, "in very broad language," provides that railways are "'liable for all damages sustained by any employee' as a consequence of the 'mismanagement' of any other employee when such mismanagement is 'connected with the use and operation' of any railway." Winslow I, 19 (citations omitted). We concluded that § 39-2-703, MCA, is not limited to personal injuries caused by co-workers to the exclusion of mismanagemen
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