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Winslow v. Montana Rail Link9/6/2005
t in the handling of an employee termination. Winslow I, 19-20. We explained that " lthough personal injury resulting from the neglect of a co-worker would be included within the ambit of the statute, so are damages which result from mismanagement connected with the operation of the railroad." Winslow I, 19.
When this Court, in deciding a case presented, states a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal. Marie Deonier v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 2004 MT 297, 75, 323 Mont. 387, 75, 101 P.3d 742, 75. The issue of whether ยง 39-2-703, MCA, provides Winslow with a statutory cause of action was sufficiently addressed in Winslow I to serve the purposes of law of the case and will not be revisited here. Therefore, we conclude that the District Court did not err in denying MRL's summary judgment and Rule 50(b), M.R.Civ.P., motions based upon the law of the case established in Winslow I.
Did the District Court err in denying MRL's motion for summary judgment and its subsequent Rule 50(b) motion on the merits of Winslow's negligent management claim?
Alternatively, MRL argues that the District Court erred when it denied its motion for summary judgment and its subsequent Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on Winslow's negligent mismanagement claim. MRL explains that the holding in Winslow I was based upon a motion to dismiss and was determined solely upon the allegations of the pleadings. MRL therefore contends that the Winslow I Court did not substantively determine whether Winslow's claims were preempted by the RLA or the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). In light of the evidentiary record, which was not reviewed in Winslow I, MRL contends that the issue of preemption must be reconsidered.
Regarding preemption under the RLA, MRL argues that Winslow's claim of negligent mismanagement is based directly on rights created by Winslow's CBA and therefore constitutes a "major dispute" as defined under the RLA, and therefore subject to the RLA's mandatory arbitral mechanism for settlement. MRL explains that a major dispute under the RLA relates to the formation or modification of the contractual rights provided for by a CBA, whereas minor disputes involve interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. MRL argues that Winslow challenged the grievance process and work rules thereby attempting to alter existing contractual rights which constitutes a "major dispute." MRL contends that Winslow presented his state-law claim of negligent mismanagement in a manner that necessarily required the court or jury to interpret existing provisions of his CBA, and that this fact alone mandates preemption since claims "founded directly on rights created by [CBAs]" are preempted by the RLA. Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc. (9th Cir. 2001), 255 F.3d 683, 689. Thus, in consideration of the evidence adduced, MRL argues that this Court must reverse the District Court's denial of MRL's motion for judgment as a matter of law because Winslow's negligent mismanagement claim is preempted by the RLA.
Winslow responds that the RLA does not preempt his negligent mismanagement claim because the law of the case doctrine applies per Winslow I, and therefore the issue may not be re-litigated. Winslow also explains that other jurisdictions have recognized state law claims that are not preempted by the RLA. Moreover, Winslow argues that he continually objected to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence of the CBA's grievance process and de
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