 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Kelleher v. Lumber12/15/2005
e fact finder could conclude that the affirmations constituted an express warranty); Chellman, 138 N.H. at 82.
Here, the jury heard evidence from which it could have concluded that the representations in the catalog were part of the basis of the bargain. For instance, the plaintiff testified that he relied upon representations in the catalog regarding the durability of windows manufactured by Marvin. However, he also testified that all of his paperwork pertaining to the construction of his residence was destroyed in 1987, and the catalog admitted at trial was a copy obtained from a worker involved in his home construction. While the plaintiff could not identify the exact document that he saw in 1986, he testified that he did "see what Marvin had available, and the only thing that Marvin had available was the catalog that showed each of the windows, the stock windows that were in place . . . ." While this evidence could support the trial court's determination that the catalog representations were part of the basis of the bargain, given the credibility issues raised, it is not so overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff that no contrary verdict could stand. Therefore, we conclude that this determination is a factual one for the jury.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the question of whether the catalog representations were part of the basis of the bargain and thus constituted an express warranty pursuant to RSA 382-A:2-313. We vacate the verdict on the breach of express warranty claim, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
2. Magnuson-Moss Claim
The defendant asserts that the catalog warranty does not qualify as a written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act because it fails to specify that the windows will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time as required by 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(6)(A).
The Magnuson-Moss Act (the Act) is a remedial statute designed to protect consumers from deceptive warranty practices. Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1981); see 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 9.06(1), at 9-73 to 9-74 (1998). It applies to written warranties as well as "implied warrant arising under State law (as modified by sections 2308 and 2304(a) of this title) in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product." 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301 (6) & (7)(1997). While the Act does not require a manufacturer or seller to extend a warranty with a product, "any 'written warranty' offered with a consumer product is subject to the Act's regulatory requirements." Skelton, 660 F.2d at 314. The purpose of the Act is "to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products." 15 U.S.C.A. § 2302(a).
Section 2310(d)(1) creates a civil cause of action for a consumer who is damaged by a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor who fails to comply with its obligations under a "written warranty." 15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d)(1). The Act defines "written warranty," in pertinent part, as:
any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free and will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time . . . which . . . becomes part of the basis of the bargain between the supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such product.
15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(6)(A). Representations regarding produ
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 New Hampshire Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|