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Crawford v. State10/20/2005 ry that it could consider the "diminished capacity of the defendant" in reaching its decision. Nevada law recognizes the M'Naghten standard and the technical defense of diminished capacity is not available in Nevada. In addition, NRS 200.050 requires provocation "sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person." Crawford's proposed instructions, including the additional heat-of-passion instructions relating to the jury's consideration of Crawford's mental or physical frailties, were erroneous statements of Nevada law. Moreover, the proposed instruction provided no guidance whatsoever on how the jury might properly consider evidence that did not rise to the level of legal insanity in evaluating whether the State had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Cross-Examination of Michael Lemon
Finally, Crawford argues that the district court committed reversible error by curtailing his cross-examination of Michael Lemon, the man whom Dugan visited on the night of the murder. Crawford contends that he had the right to inquire whether Lemon was romantically involved with Dugan in order to expose his potential bias. Additionally, Crawford contends that Lemon's testimony about his relationship with Dugan was critical to the defense because it would have supported Crawford's heat-of-passion defense by giving credence to his belief that Dugan was involved with a third man.
The district court has discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination, provided "sufficient cross-examination has been permitted to satisfy the sixth amendment." We have recognized that the district court's discretion to curtail cross-examination is more limited if the purpose of cross-examination is to expose bias. In those instances, "counsel must be permitted to elicit any facts which might color a witness's testimony."
In this case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in curtailing the cross-examination of Lemon. Lemon testified that Dugan left his house shortly before 10 p.m.; she called him when she got home; and while they were talking on the telephone, the doorbell rang, and Dugan ended the conversation. The State offered Lemon's testimony merely to establish the time that Crawford arrived at Dugan's home, a fact that Crawford did not dispute. Even if Crawford had been allowed to inquire into whether Lemon and Dugan were romantically involved, evidence of a relationship between Lemon and Dugan would not have affected the jury's perception of Lemon's testimony. Accordingly, we conclude that Crawford was not prejudiced by the district court's refusal to permit him to pursue on cross-examination a line of inquiry that went well beyond the scope of Lemon's testimony on direct examination.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that Crawford has failed to demonstrate reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
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