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Langan v. St. Vincent's Hospital of New York10/11/2005
8). The stated purpose of such recognition is "to prevent the great inconvenience and cruelty of bastardizing the issue of such marriages, and to avoid the public mischief which would result from the loose state in which people so situated would live" (Van Voorhis v Brintnall, id. at 26 [quoting Medway v Needham, 16 Mass 157, 159]).
The plaintiff acknowledges, as he must, that he and the decedent never entered a marriage. Nevertheless, he and amici maintain that the same considerations of comity must lead New York to recognize his Vermont civil union inasmuch as there is nothing to suggest that a civil union of same-sex individuals is abhorrent to the public policy of New York (cf. Workers Comp Law § 4; Executive Law § 291 and ; Civil Rights Law § 40-c; 18 NYCRR 421.16 ; Matter of Jacob, 86 NY2d 651, 662; Braschi v Stahl Assoc., supra; People v Onofre, 51 NY2d 476, cert denied 451 US 987). But recognition of a civil status validly created outside of New York does not necessarily imply that this State will give effect to all of the legal incidents of that status conferred by the foreign jurisdiction that created it. Where those incidents conflict with New York law, our courts will generally decide whether to give them effect by looking to traditional choice-of-law principles.
In Matter of Chase (127 AD2d 415), for example, children adopted under the laws of Rhode Island but living in New York sought to inherit from their natural parents. Under New York law, a child's right to inherit from his or her natural parents is extinguished upon adoption (see Domestic Relations Law § 117 ) but the same is not true under the laws of Rhode Island (see RI Gen Laws § 15-7-17).
Ruling that the children could not inherit from their natural parents, the Court wrote:
"While the parties agree that New York, by the law of comity, must recognize [the children's] status as adopted, even though such status was acquired under the laws of Rhode Island . . . , they disagree concerning which State's law controls the adjudication of [the children's] rights as adopted children . . . Even where a status created in another jurisdiction is recognized by a court of this State, all of the incidents which the other jurisdiction attaches to such status need not be recognized . . . he rights of [the children] to inherit must be determined pursuant to New York law. Such result is not unfair here since Rhode Island has no contacts with this case other than the fact that the adoption decree was rendered there. On the other hand, New York was the domicile of decedent and New York has a strong interest in enforcing its statute regarding the inheritance rights of adopted children." (Matter of Estate of Chase, supra at 417; see also Matter of Crichton, 20 NY2d 124 [refusing application of Louisiana community property laws to govern right of New York domiciliary to her deceased husband's personal property located in Louisiana]).
The right to maintain an action for wrongful death is a legal incident of the status conferred by Vermont's civil union law (see Vt Stat Ann, tit 15, § 1204 ). On the question of whether to give that incident effect here, I find it significant that there is no evidence that the plaintiff and the decedent had any contacts with Vermont beyond the fact that their civil union was solemnized there. Moreover, Vermont enacted its civil union law in response to a holding of its Supreme Court that same-sex couples were entitled to legal acknowledgment "as Vermonters who seek nothing more, nor less, than legal protection and security for their avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human relationship" (Baker v State, supra at 229 [emphasis supplied]), and that, under the Comm
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