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Bovis Lend Lease LMB12/15/2005
th insured's business and by individuals for whom insured was obligated to procure workers' compensation insurance; explanation for delay too vague]; Squires v Marini Bldrs., 293 AD2d 808, 810 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 502 [insurer waited 42 days after receiving plaintiff's complaint, which alleged his employment status, the sole factor in determining whether to deny coverage, and did not assert that it had any reason to doubt the allegations of the complaint]; Matter of Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v Steiner (199 AD2d 507 [2d Dept 1993] [unexplained 41-day delay in disclaiming on ground of untimely notice of accident]).
In view of our finding that Royal's notice of disclaimer to Bovis and Columbia was untimely as a matter of law and therefore of no effect, we need not reach the issue of whether the disclaimer was valid as to these parties.
We turn next to the question of the applicability of § 3420(d) to National Union, the other insurer of Bovis and Columbia. In reaching a determination on that issue, we must look to the express language of the statute and its underlying purposes.
A statute must be construed so as to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and the clearest indicator of the legislative intent is the plain meaning of the language (see Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 ). Here, the statute clearly mandates that an insurer must as soon as is reasonably possible give written notice of disclaimer of liability or denial of coverage for death or bodily injury under a liability policy to "the insured and the injured person or any other claimant." Consistent with the purpose of liability insurance, i.e., to provide coverage for liability to third parties, the plain meaning of the quoted language is that an insurer must give prompt written notice of disclaimer of liability or denial of coverage not only to the insured but also to any party that has a claim against the insured arising under the policy (see e.g. Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co. v J.J. Wicks, Inc., 104 AD2d 289, 293 , appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 691 [where patient died allegedly because of anesthesia equipment improperly refitted by contractor, contractor's insurer was held obligated to give timely notice of disclaimer to contractor, and to plaintiff in wrongful death action, and to hospital]). The purpose of § 3420(d) is "to protect the insured, the injured person, and any other interested party who has a real stake in the outcome, from being prejudiced by a belated denial of coverage" (Excelsior Ins. Co. v Antretter Contr. Corp., 262 AD2d 124, 127 ).
A review of the statutory language itself demonstrates that another insurer does not fall within the specified categories. National Union is certainly not Royal's insured, nor is it an injured person or other party (i.e., claimant) who has a claim against the insured arising under the Royal policy. No extended discussion is necessary for the elementary proposition that an insurer can have no liability claim against its own insured for the risk covered (see Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v Austin Powder Co., 68 NY2d 465, 471-472 ).
That § 3420(d) was never intended to apply to another insurer is buttressed by a review of the various other provisions of § 3420 and their emphasis on protecting the insured and those who have claims against the insured covered by the liability insurance policy in issue. For example, § 3420(a) requires that policies insuring against liability for injury to person or injury to or destruction of property contain certain standard provisions "or provisions which are equally or more favorable to the insured." Among these are the provision that where a judgment against the insure
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