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State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Condon9/30/2005
gy Servs. (2001), 144 Ohio App.3d 410, 417, 760 N.E.2d 453.
{ } Here, we do not contest the trial court's factual findings about the duration of the coverage periods, but we do hold that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the meaning of the contract term "occurrence," confusing it with the accrual of a claim. Our resolution of these issues on appeal requires only the interpretation of the policy terms. These issues raise only questions of law that we review de novo. See Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 374 N.E.2d 146; see, also, Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Indiana Ins. Co. (Dec. 23, 1999), 1st Dist. Nos. C-980947 and C-990009.
{ } There is no requirement in the policies that the harm to third persons be completed during a covered period. The policies do not require that a cause of action by third persons must accrue during coverage. As the term is defined in the policies, "occurrence" refers to the accident or the offense or series of related offenses that result in an injury to third persons. The occurrence in this case was Condon's manipulation and photography of the bodies in the morgue. Condon completed all the acts underlying his convictions for the gross abuse of the corpses between August 2000 and January 2001.
{ } Thus, some portion of the photographs was taken during the second covered period. Because Condon seeks coverage against a class action, for purposes of this declaratory-judgment action, it is impossible to identify which plaintiffs have claims related to photographs taken under the covered period and those that do not. Thus, the allegations only state claims "which potentially or arguably within the coverage period." Willoughby Hills v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. (1984), 9 Ohio St. 3d 177, 180, 459 N.E.2d 555.
Personal Injury , Intentional Acts and the Penal Statute Exclusion
{ } But Condon's success on the coverage-dates issue presents only a hollow victory. Both Condon and State Farm agree that, at the time the trial court entered judgment in this case, the only claims remaining against Condon from the federal lawsuits were claims under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code. See T.d. 16, Exhibit F. State Farm asserts that state claims for civil conspiracy, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and unjust enrichment have been subsequently reinstated against Condon. This is not reflected in the record certified for our review. See App.R. 9(A). The written decision of the federal court reinstating the state claims has been appended to State Farm's appellate brief. Because the federal court's decision came after the trial court's judgment and was not part of the record before the trial court, we cannot decide this appeal on the basis of that decision. See State v. Ishmail (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 377 N.E.2d 500, syllabus; see, also, Cincinnati School Dist. v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 1st Dist. No. C-040434, 2005-Ohio-1876, fn. 2.
{ } Condon acknowledges that the central tenets of the remaining federal claims, as reflected in the record, are claims for personal injury for violations of privacy arising out of Condon's wrongful entry into the morgue and his written publication of the morgue photographs. But following the long-standing public policy in Ohio that "liability insurance does not exist to relieve wrongdoers of liability for intentional, antisocial, criminal conduct," Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 34, 38, 1996-Ohio-113, 665 N.E.2d 1115, the policies exclude coverage for injuries resulting from intentional and criminal acts. In subsection 16(d), the exclusions section of the policy, coverage "does not apply to * * * personal injury * * * arising out of the wi
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