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Cunningham v. Children's Hospital8/18/2005
{ } Plaintiff-appellant, Nicole Cunningham ("appellant"), as the personal representative of the Estate of Kirsten Cunningham, deceased, appeals from the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, Children's Hospital, Steven Teich, M.D. ("Dr. Teich"), and Columbus Pediatric Surgical Assoc., Inc. ("Columbus Pediatric") (collectively "appellees").
{ } On May 30, 2003, appellant filed her complaint against Children's Hospital, Dr. Teich, Columbus Pediatric, William Wallace, M.D., and unidentified Doe defendants, alleging claims for medical malpractice and wrongful death. Such claims arise as a result of the death of appellant's daughter, Kirsten Cunningham ("Kirsten"), who was born on February 17, 1999. On March 9, 1999, Kirsten was admitted to Children's Hospital, where she remained until she was discharged on August 27, 1999. After Kirsten's discharge from Children's Hospital, appellant traveled across the street to the Ronald McDonald House, where she had been staying during Kirsten's hospitalization. Noticing Kirsten's labored breathing, appellant immediately returned to the Children's Hospital emergency room, where Kirsten died the same day.
{ } In her complaint, appellant alleged that appellees were professionally negligent and fell below accepted standards of medical care by:
* * * ail to timely recognize, assess, evaluate and diagnose and treat the serious signs and symptoms exhibited by Kirsten Cunningham in the days prior to her discharge; fail to recommend immediate surgical or medical intervention; and otherwise unnecessarily delay the urgent medical and surgical care required by Kirsten Cunningham.
Appellant further alleged that appellees' negligence "caused Kirsten Cunningham to be prematurely discharged from the hospital and to expire before she left the hospital campus."
{ } In August 2004, appellees filed motions for summary judgment supported by Dr. Teich's expert affidavit. Appellant responded to appellees' motions and submitted her own affidavit, along with a copy of an unsigned, unsworn letter purportedly authored by Alison St. Germaine Brent, M.D. ("Dr. Brent"). On December 22, 2004, the trial court issued a decision granting appellees' motions for summary judgment. The trial court filed its final judgment entry on January 26, 2005.
{ } In her sole assignment of error, appellant asserts:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
{ } Under her single assignment of error, appellant argues that she submitted expert evidence sufficient to overcome appellees' motions for summary judgment, that she was not required to produce expert evidence in support of her claims, and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies and obviates any need for expert evidence in support of her claims. Because we find that the trial court appropriately entered summary judgment in appellees' favor, we affirm.
{ } We conduct a de novo review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Koos v. Cent. Ohio Cellular, Inc. (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 579, 588, citing Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711. We apply the same standard as the trial court and conduct an independent review, without deference to the trial court's determination. Maust v. Bank One Columbus, N.A. (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 103, 107; Brown at 711. We must affirm the trial court's judgment if any of the grounds the movant raised before the trial court support the judgment. Coventry Twp. v. Ecker (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41-42.
{ } Summary judgment is appropriate only where: (1)
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