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Wilson v. Marino12/9/2005 mployee relationship." The facts contained in the record do not support appellant's contention.
{ } It is undisputed that Toledo Hospital and Promedica were in full compliance with requirements of the Worker's Compensation Act at all times relevant to appellant's lawsuit; appellant was injured during the course of her employment; and she initially sought treatment at OccuHealth, which is operated by appellees to treat injured workers. It is further undisputed that Grady is an independent practitioner and not an employee of OccuHealth, Toledo Hospital or Promedica. In addition, evidence was presented that Marino, an employee of Toledo Hospital, was acting within the scope of her job duties as a workers' compensation specialist when she gave appellant Grady's name. As previously determined, Marino's actions did not violate Ohio law or established hospital policy.
{ } On consideration of the foregoing, we find the only relationship between appellees and appellant was employer-employee. Accordingly, the dual-capacity doctrine does not apply, and appellant's argument is without merit.
{ } In her next three arguments, appellant essentially asserts that, as a result of Marino's suggestion that appellant seek treatment from Grady, appellees are liable for Grady's negligence. We disagree, for the following reasons.
{ } First, appellees have no direct liability for appellant's alleged injury . As set forth above, Marino's suggestion that appellant seek treatment from Grady did not constitute practicing medicine without a license; violated no established hospital policy or other legal duty to appellant; and did not expose Toledo Hospital and Promedica to tort liability under the dual-capacity doctrine.
{ } Second, as set forth above, the record shows a jury trial was held, after which Grady was found not negligent, and therefore not liable for appellant's alleged injuries. No appeal was taken from the jury's verdict based on the actual evidence presented at trial. As stated in our determination of appellant's second assignment of error, the trial court did not err by refusing to allow Diment, an orthopedist, to give his opinion as an expert on the chiropractic standard of care. Accordingly, appellees have no liability for appellant's alleged injury based on Grady's negligence, and the remaining issues of whether Marino knew Grady was "incompetent" and whether Grady's alleged negligence constitutes an "intervening cause" of injury that absolves appellees of liability are irrelevant.
{ } Appellant last argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to appellees because an issue of fact exists as to whether appellees and Grady were engaged in a pattern of corrupt activity, in violation of R.C. 2923.21 and 2923.32. In support, appellant argues that a jury "could have concluded" appellees and Grady "were an enterprise involved in coercing and misleading injured employees of [Toledo] Hospital to accept chiropractic treatment from Defendant Grady instead of physical therapy ordered by their treating physicians."
{ } Pursuant to R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), the Ohio civil RICO statute, "No person employed by, or associated with any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity or the collection of an unlawful debt." (Emphasis added). The term "enterprise" is statutorily defined as "any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership, corporation, trust, union, government agency, or other legal entity, or any organization, association, or group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity. * * *." R.C. 2329.31(C).
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