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Ewers v. Hospice of Dayton12/2/2005
uffered from atrial fibrillation.
{ } "8. Ms. Ewers' PT/INR levels were periodically checked and were within normal ranges.
{ } "9. I hold the following opinions within reasonable medical probability based upon my education, training, and experience, my review of the record, and my care and treatment of Ms. Ewers:
{ } "a. The evaluation, care, and treatment I provided to Ms. Ewers met all acceptable standards of care for internists in like or similar circumstances; and
{ } "b. My evaluation, care, and treatment did not proximately cause Ms. Ewers['] injury or death."
{ } Clark's affidavit provided specific information about the manner in which he had cared for Dorothy in addition to his conclusion that his care had met all acceptable medical standards. Although his description of the care he provided was brief, it demonstrated the conditions from which Dorothy suffered, the medications he prescribed for those conditions, and the combination of medications that she received while in his care. In other words, it provided specific information from which another physician could offer an opinion as to the reasonableness of his treatment. Thus, the affidavit was not so conclusory as to be insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment. Ewers's identification of an expert, without offering any evidence of the type permitted by Civ.R. 56(C) to substantiate what opinion the expert would offer, did not comply with the requirements of Civ.R. 56 and was insufficient to survive summary judgment.
{ } The first assignment of error is overruled.
{ } II. "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CONTINUE THE TIME FOR FILING A RESPONSE AS TO DEFENDANT JERRY CLARK, MD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION."
{ } Under this assignment, Ewers reiterates her previous argument that the motion for summary judgment was filed so early in the discovery process as to make it unreasonable to require her to respond. In our view, the record speaks for itself on this issue. Insofar as the complaint had been filed a full year before the motion for summary judgment, we find this argument to be without merit. Moreover, we note that Ewers was not required to be ready to present her case in full, but simply to rebut Clark's basic assertion that there had been no malpractice. She offered no evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to Clark's malpractice and failed to avail herself of Civ.R. 56(F) in a timely manner if, for a sufficient reason, she was unable to do so. Thus, the trial court acted reasonably in rejecting her request for a continuance and overruling her motion for reconsideration.
{ } The second assignment of error is overruled.
{ } The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
FAIN, J. and DONOVAN, J., concur.
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