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Diquattro v. Stellar Group12/7/2005
t only when:
" fter construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, [the court] finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue."
{ } When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the court considers the sufficiency of the evidence. Wagner v. Roche Laboratories (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 116, 119, reversed on other grounds (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 457.
"When a motion for a directed verdict is entered, what is being tested is a question of law; that is, the legal sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury. This does not involve weighing the evidence or trying the credibility of witnesses; it is in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence and assumes the truth of the evidence supporting the facts essential to the claim of the party against whom the motion is directed, and gives to that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences from that evidence." Ruta, 69 Ohio St.2d at 68; see, also Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 284-85.
{ } If the party opposing the motion for a directed verdict fails to present evidence on one or more of the essential elements of a claim, a directed verdict is proper. Hargrove v. Tanner (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 693, 695. However, where substantial evidence is presented such that reasonable minds could come to differing conclusions, the court should deny the motion. Posin v. A.B.C. Motor Court Hotel, Inc. (1997), 45 Ohio St.2d 271, 275. Under the "reasonable minds" portion of Civ.R. 50(A)(4), the court is only required to consider whether there exists any evidence of probative value in support of the elements of the non-moving party's claim. See Coleman v. Excello-Textron Corp. (1989), 60 Ohio App.3d 32, 40; Ruta, 69 Ohio St.2d at 69.
{ } Appellant filed suit under the Dram Shop Act, R.C. 4399.18. At the conclusion of Appellant's case, Appellee moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that R.C. 4399.18 created liability only for the negligent conduct of its intoxicated patrons. Appellee contended that it could not be held liable for Appellant's injuries which were indisputably caused by the intentional actions of its intoxicated patron.
{ } R.C. 4399.18 provides a narrow exception to the general rule that liquor permit holders are absolved of liability for actions of intoxicated persons to whom they sold alcohol:
"A person has a cause of action against a permit holder or an employee of a permit holder for personal injury , death, or property damage caused by the negligent actions of an intoxicated person occurring off the premises or away from a parking lot under the permit holder's control only when both of the following can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence: "(A) The permit holder or an employee of the permit holder knowingly sold an intoxicating beverage to at least one of the following: "(1) A noticeably intoxicated person in violation of division (B) of [R.C. 4301.22]; "(2) A person in violation of [R.C. 4301.69]. "(B) The person's intoxication proximately caused the personal injury, death, or property damage."
{ } The legislature enacted R.C. 4399.18 in 1986, and it "now provides the sole means for imposing liability on a liquor permit holder when a third party suffers injuries caused by the permit holder's intoxicated patron." Tollett v. Bokor (Apr. 26, 2000), 9th Dist. No. 98CA007227, at *4; See Klever v. Canton Sachsenheim, Inc. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 419, 421.
{ } Notably, Appe
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