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Cohen v. University of Dayton10/28/2005
unsel, based upon affidavits, deposition, and other discovery materials of record, or after conducting an evidentiary hearing. The standard of review from such decisions is one of abuse of discretion." Id., at 562.
{ } We decline to go so far as to remove cases involving good-faith-settlement defenses to contribution claims from the operation of Civ. R. 56, particularly the limitations imposed therein upon the kind of evidence that may be considered in connection with a motion for summary judgment. "No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule." Civ. R. 56(C). We note that the quality of the evidence does not seem to have been raised as an issue in the appeal in Mahathiraj, supra.
{ } We do note with approval the following passage in Mahathiraj:
{ } "In the final analysis, a totality of the circumstances standard enables the trial court to consider the potential proportionate liability of the parties in cases where such determinations are appropriate, but does not require the court to consider it in every case or in cases where such calculations would be of little value in good faith determinations. As a result, parties have a greater incentive to settle than they would under a standard which forces them to defend their settlements whenever the mere allegation of a disproportionate settlement is made. At the same time, courts are free to police collusive settlements that unfairly saddle one tortfeasor with a disproportionate share of liability." Id., at 561.
{ } Cohen and Morgan argue that if the University is permitted to take Morgan's deposition, the result will be mini-trials of the liability of the various alleged tortfeasors, with the result that one of the principal advantages of settlement -- the avoidance of expensive and protracted litigation -- would become unavailable. The University argues that because it is required to demonstrate that their settlement was not made in good faith, it ought to be able to take the depositions of the two parties to that settlement -- Cohen and Morgan.
{ } We agree with Cohen and Morgan that a trial court must be accorded substantial discretion to limit the scope of discovery in cases involving good-faith-settlement defenses to contribution, lest they become mini-trials of the individual liability of alleged joint tortfeasors. In this case, that substantial discretion could have been exercised both to limit the University's remaining discovery to the taking of Morgan's deposition, to which it had already become resigned in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's original order, and to limit the extent of that deposition.
{ } In this case, it had already become evident that Morgan was, by far, the most culpable of the joint tortfeasors, having been the person who directly caused the fire that claimed Austin Cohen's life. Because the total claim against the University evidently exceeded $1,000,000, the $191,800 settlement with Morgan was already shown to have been disproportionate in a pure comparative fault sense. If that settlement was going to be shown to have been in good faith, presumably it was going to be shown to have been the limit, or near the limit, of the resources available to pay a judgment against Morgan. That would involve an analysis of available insurance coverage and other assets of Morgan's upon which Cohen could levy to pay a judgment. In this connection, we would reject any argument that Cohen must, in the exercise of good faith, await patiently some future day when Morgan may enjoy a greater net worth.
{ } Thus, the likely appropriate scope of Morgan's deposition would be limited to an analysis of his available resources, in
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