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Jelinek v. Abbott Laboratories10/27/2005
aukee, Wisconsin, was offered a lateral position as district manager in Memphis, Tennessee.
{ } Defendants presented evidence to support the idea that the decision to offer plaintiff the Gary, Indiana position was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. In fact, the jury found that "Defendants demonstrate that the action they took in transferring Plaintiff to Lake County, Indiana was for reasons other than Plaintiff's age." (Jury Interrogatory II.A.2.) However, the jury further found that plaintiff "demonstrate that the reason(s) for transferring Plaintiff to Lake County, Indiana were false." (Jury Interrogatory II.A.3.)
{ } Upon our review of the record, we conclude that there was legally sufficient evidence presented at trial for the jury to conclude that Abbott discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of age, and that Mr. Insani and Mr. Lindberg participated in the discrimination. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for JNOV.
{ } As stated above, the trial court conditionally granted a new trial should its granting of JNOV be reversed on appeal. Significantly, in this appeal, plaintiff has not separately assigned as error the trial court's conditional granting of a new trial as to the issue of plaintiff's age discrimination claim, but he does argue that the motion for a new trial should have been denied. We note that Civ.R. 50(C) provides that if the motion for JNOV provided for in Civ.R. 50(B) is granted, then the court shall rule on the motion for a new trial. Thus, the trial court's decision regarding a new trial was a necessary determination given its granting of the JNOV. Therefore, we find it necessary to address the issue of whether the trial court erred in conditionally granting a new trial.
{ } Although this court's review of the trial court's granting of JNOV is de novo, our review of its granting of a new trial is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. "It is well-settled law that the decision on a motion for a new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59 is within the discretion of the trial court. The trial court's decision will be disturbed only upon a showing that such decision was unreasonable, unconscionable or arbitrary." Sharp v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 307, 312. Furthermore, in Malone v. Courtyard by Marriott L.P. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 440, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated:
The abuse of discretion standard requires a reviewing court to "view the evidence favorably to the trial court's action rather than to the original jury's verdict." * * * This deference to a trial court's grant of a new trial stems in part from the recognition that the trial judge is better situated than a reviewing court to pass on questions of witness credibility and the "surrounding circumstances and atmosphere of the trial."
Id. at 448, quoting Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82.
{ } Although it is not entirely clear upon what grounds the trial court granted the new trial, the trial court, in its May 20, 2003 decision, set forth one of the bases for granting a new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A). Citing Civ.R. 59(A)(6) and Rhode, supra, at 93, the trial court noted that it had the authority to grant a new trial if it concluded that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Civ.R. 59(A) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues upon any of the following grounds: * * *
(6) The judgment is not sustained by the weight of the evidence; however, only one new trial may be granted on the weight of the evide
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