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City of Enid7/5/2005
ing cautionary language contained in Reynolds at footnote 36 thereof:
We do not express an opinion as to the proper test to be applied in identifying a class for other subjects enumerated in Art. 5, § 46, Okl. Const. The test we adopt for identifying the class in measuring the validity of a civil action's limitation by the strictures in § 46 is not necessarily applicable to other subjects enumerated in that section.
(emphasis added). 760 P.2d at 823, n. 36. Plainly, footnote 36's cautionary comment is unequivocally speaking about the test for class identification purposes relevant and vital to the determination of deciding whether the particular legislation under review, because of its class line-drawing, is or is not to be considered a special or local law violative of the strictures contained in § 46.
The Court has made clear, on numerous occasions, that the mere fact that legislation uses population as a criterion for application of a particular statutory scheme, is not always decisive of the special or local versus general law question. The inquiry must dig deeper to uncover whether the Legislature has merely used population to act as a subterfuge for the purpose of passing a special law in the form of a general one. Key v. Donnell, 231 P. at 549. In other words, is the classification of cities by population a legitimate one, and does it really bear some reasonable relation to the subject-matter adopted by the legislative body, or is the population classification only an arbitrary or capricious classification, used as a subterfuge to cloak a special or local law in general law garb. See id. If the determination is made that the legislation at issue is a general law the inquiry ends and the legislation passes muster under § 46.
Very simply, the majority opinion, incorrectly in my view, holds that a law is automatically to be categorized as special or local in nature, and, thus, violative of § 46, if it classifies cities in regard to a particular piece of legislation by population when the legislation involves regulating city affairs. In effect, the majority opinion defines a local or special law, for § 46 purposes, as any law that is not coextensive with one of the twenty-eight (28) categories listed in § 46. As it relates to regulating the affairs of cities, the majority opinion is simply wrong in such regard. In my view, cities may be classified into similarly situated municipalities based on their population when the Legislature, in its wisdom, has a legitimate, reasonable and rational reason to do so in the legislation under review.
What the majority opinion does is mistakenly mix up the categories of subjects contained in § 46 with what is or is not a special or local law concerning those subjects. Reynolds itself does not make this fundamental mistake. As Reynolds makes plain, " statute relating to all persons or things of a class is a general law; one relating to particular persons or things of a class is a special law. . . . Special laws are those which single out less than an entire class of similarly affected persons or things for different treatment." (footnotes omitted). Reynolds, 760 P.2d at 822. In Elias v. City of Tulsa, 1965 OK 164, 408 P.2d 517, the Court said the following:
Classification by reference to population must be a legitimate one, and bear some reasonable relation to the subject matter, and must not be an arbitrary or capricious classification and used as a subterfuge for the purpose of passing a special law under the form of a general law.
Id. at 519-520, citing Key v. Donnell. Elias also said this concerning local or special laws:
Invalid local or special laws rest on a fal
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