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City of Enid7/5/2005
se or deficient classification. Their vice is that they do not embrace all the class that they should naturally embrace. They create preference and establish inequality. They apply to persons, things, and places possessed of certain qualities or situations and exclude from their effect other persons, things, or places which are not dissimilar in this respect.
Id. at 518 (Second Syllabus by the Court).
Thus, we must answer the question of whether cities with populations greater than 35,000 are similarly situated to cities with 35,000 or less populations, for the purpose of collective bargaining in regard to municipal employees - the subject of the pertinent legislation before us - to properly discern whether the Act, in light of its population classification, is a special or local law, or, instead, a general law. Only if the population classification is arbitrary or capricious, or stated another way, bears no legitimate, rational or reasonable relation to the subject matter of the statutory scheme, thereby leaving out cities that should be included because there is no real basis for excluding them, is this Court warranted in concluding that the classification has created a special or local law susceptible to being struck down under § 46 for constitutional infirmity.
The bottom line here is that, contrary to the view of the majority opinion, § 46 did not and does not have an intent to absolutely outlaw classification of cities on the basis of population in regard to legislation regulating the affairs of cities. In my view, the majority opinion incorrectly limits the power of the Legislature to deal with potentially weighty problems and issues when it comes to cities and population, whereas the Oklahoma Constitution contains no such limitation in art. 5, § 46. The majority opinion errs in so ruling and, accordingly, I must respectfully dissent in part to the majority opinion.
EDMONDSON, J., Dissenting.
Because the Constitution and our previous opinions do not support the Court's analysis, I respectfully dissent.
The Oklahoma Constitution states that a statute may be classified as a "general law" or a "special law." When the Legislature has created an alleged special law in violation of Art. 5 § 59, the Court has determined whether the classification was reasonable. If the law is reasonable it is a general law, not a constitutionally allowed special law.
Article 5 § 46 also prohibits special laws. The Court's opinion states that for the purpose of Article 5 § 46, a law may be reasonable but still retain its classification as a special law and thus be prohibited. The Court states that this conclusion is mandated by Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, 760 P.2d 816. This is incorrect.
The Court clearly does not follow its pre-Reynolds § 46 jurisprudence. In § 46 opinions the Court has used its § 59 opinions defining a special law when defining a special law for the purpose of § 46. Sections 46 and 59 were not new concepts when our Constitution was created, and the Court today does not follow what the framers of the Oklahoma Constitution intended when §§ 46 and 59 were created.
I. Sections 46 and 59 of the Constitution
The statute before us states that it applies to municipalities with "a population greater than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons . . . ." Is this statute an unconstitutional special or local law? It is not, and our Constitution has three provisions - Art. 5 §§ 32, 46, and 59 - which support this conclusion.
Our Constitution states that the Legislature should enact a general law, if possible, as opposed to a special law:
Laws of a g
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