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City of Enid7/5/2005
ning an invalid special law pursuant to Art. 5 § 46. Barrett then concluded that the law was an invalid special law for purpose of both Art. 5 § 46 and § 59. Id. at 0. This conclusion makes sense because the court was using the same definition for "special" for both § 46 and § 59. Barrett serves as an example of the Court using its § 59 opinions to define a special law for the purpose of § 46.
In Wilkinson v. Hale, 1939 OK 11, 86 P.2d 305, the Court determined that the challenged legislation violated Art. 5 § 46 "by reason of the arbitrary and capricious nature of the classification therein adopted." Id. at 0. The Court did not expressly conclude that § 59 was violated, although a § 59 challenge was made. Id. at 7. Wilkinson, like the Court in Barrett, discussed classifications made by the Legislature, noting that a "classification so adopted must be neither arbitrary nor capricious and must bear a reasonable relation to the object to be accomplished. 1939 OK 11, 10. But the classification was unreasonable, and thus § 46 was violated. In any event, the reasonableness of the classification was evaluated by the Court in the context of a § 46 challenge.
IV. REYNOLDS v. PORTER
In Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, 760 P.2d 816, the Court stated that if a statute is a special law the Court need not consider the law's reasonableness. Id. at 17, 760 P.2d at 822-823. The Court need only determine for a § 46 analysis whether the statute upon a subject listed in § 46 "targets for different treatment less than an entire class of similarly situated persons or things." Id. at 17, 760 P.2d at 823, emphasis deleted. Thus, every § 46 claim involves identifying a class.
In a circumstance involving "limitations," a subject listed in § 46, Reynolds stated:
The § 46 subject dealt with in the three-year restriction under inquiry here is the limitation of a civil action. In determining whether the statute operates on an entire class of actionable claims that are similarly situated, we identify the class by reference to the general legislative scheme of limitations patterned after the English legal tradition that includes the common-law gloss.
Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, at 18, 760 P.2d at 823, emphasis deleted.
Does Reynolds mean that the Legislature may not discriminate between different types of actions? Must all actions have the same limitations period? Of course not. The class was not the subject "limitations" but the classifications found in the law relating to limitations. The Framers of § 46 knew the difference between a tort and a contract and how different limitations were enacted for them. In Reynolds we merely identified "negligent tort claims" as a class from which the Legislature could not create subclasses for the purpose of limitations. Id. at 18, 760 P.2d 823.
In sum, in Reynolds we discussed the common-law classifications for limitations, and this was proper because the Framers knew of these classifications for limitations. Section 46 is about classification. The Court's opinion is silent relating to the common-law involving the classification of cities by population.
Oklahoma's first Legislature contained members who knew the Constitution. Classifications for cities based upon population were common at this time and were codified in the statutes of the first Legislature. Classification based upon population for incorporation and organization was expressly allowed by the Constitution in Article 18. There were cities of the "First Class" having a population of 2,000 or more. General Statutes 1908, § 699. Beyond organization according to population, the Legislature was concern
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