City of Enid7/5/2005
.2d at 824, such as the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act, regulating the affairs of some but not all cities. Under the strictest application of art. 5, § 46, the Act clearly and overtly violates that constitutional provision. We hold the language "with a population greater than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons" in the definition of "municipal employer" in 11 O.S.Supp.2004, § 51-202(12) offends the Okla. Const., art. 5, § 46. This is the dispositive issue. The Act, limiting its application to cities over 35,000 in population, is unconstitutional.
V. Oklahoma Constitution, art. 5, § 59
The parties presented substantial arguments under the Okla. Const., art. 5, § 59. Although we have ruled on the dispositive issue and hold the Act invalid under art. 5, § 46, we briefly address the requirements of Okla. Const., art. 5, § 59, which states:
Laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State, and where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.
This constitutional provision permits the Legislature to pass special laws only when the subject and purpose of the legislation cannot be dealt with by general law. Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, , 760 P.2d 816, 822, recognized that the bench and bar have confused the requirements of art. 5, §§ 46 and 59 when a statute is attacked under both sections. Reynolds involved a statute of limitations, one of the subject areas listed in art. 5., § 46, that applied only to medical malpractice actions. As in this case, the statute was challenged under art. 5, §§ 46 and 59. Reynolds concluded the statute of limitation was a special law contrary to art. 5, § 46 because it applied only in medical malpractice actions and did not apply in all common-law tort actions.
Reynolds enunciated a three-prong inquiry to determine if a special law is valid under art. 5, § 59. Id., at , 760 P.2d at 822. The inquiry starts by identifying the class affected by the statute. If the class includes all persons, things or entities naturally related, it is a general law, Jack v. State, 1937 OK 394, , 82 P.2d 1033, 1035; but if not, it is a special law and the inquiry continues to the second prong to determine if the statute can be made applicable to the whole class; and if not, the inquiry continues to the third prong to determine whether the subclass is rationally related to the subject of the statute.
Reynolds said that if the statute relates to one of the twenty-eight subject areas listed in art. 5, § 46, our inquiry stops with the first prong of the art. 5, § 59 analysis. The first prong determines if the law is general or special. If it is a general law, then it is valid under art. 5, § 46. If it is a special law, as in Reynolds and in this case, it is prohibited because the constitutional framers predetermined that legislation on the twenty-eight subject areas listed in § 46 must always be by general law. Id. at , 760 P.2d at 822-823.
We recognize that under art. 5, § 59, a classification is reasonable if the distinction of the persons, entities or things has a sound and rational relation to the subject of the legislation. Sheldon v. Grand River Dam Authority, 1938 OK 76, , 76 P.2d 355, 360. See also Hudgins v. Foster, 1928 OK 243, , 267 P. 645, 649 (striking down a statute abolishing township offices in forty-nine counties but not the remaining twenty-eight counties for lack of good reason under art. 5, § 59); Elias v. City of Tulsa, 1965 OK 164, -10 and 20, 408 P.2d 517, 519-520 (striking down a statute providing for city-county cooperative planning commission with population limits to fit Tulsa only as arbitrary and a subt
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