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t's last hazardous exposure to the trauma-dealing conditions of the employment for more than one-hundred twenty days during Medmarc's coverage period. So, said OPCIGA, Medmarc was solely responsible for Claimant's benefits under §11(b)(5).
On consideration of the testimony, evidence and argument, the trial court found: (1) the 1997 Joint Petition adjudicated only the injury to Claimant's right hand, not to his left thumb; (2) "on March 13, 2000, laimant became aware had sustained accidental personal injury as a result of cumulative trauma to the Thumb of the left hand arising out of and in the course of laimant's employment" with Employer; and (3) "Claimant's last injurious exposure to said trauma was on August 29, 2002." On these findings, the trial court concluded:
THAT . . . all liability for the alleged injury herein is found against MEDMARC CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY herein pursuant to 85 O.S. [§]11(B)(5). Although the legal awareness predated the OCTOBER 23, 2001 change in the statute, the cumulative trauma injury continued beyond that date until the laimant's AUGUST 29, 2002 last date of exposure. His exposure from MARCH 2000 until AUGUST 29, 2002 did not change and the injury continued to occur during this time period.
(Emphasis original.) The trial court consequently ordered Medmarc to pay Claimant accrued benefits for 13 weeks of temporary total disability, 25 weeks of permanent partial disability, as well as "all reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred by aimant as a result of said injury." By supplemental order, the trial court subsequently held "Villanova Insurance Company/Oklahoma Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund is not liable/responsible for any benefits herein and is hereby dismissed with prejudice."
Petitioners now seek review in this Court, but raise no challenge to the trial court's adjudication of Claimant's compensable injuries. Consequently, the only question to be resolved concerns who, as between OPCIGA and Medmarc, will bear responsibility for payment of Claimant's benefits.
In three substantive propositions, Petitioners argue that the date of Claimant's "awareness" of the job -related cumulative trauma injury to his left thumb determines the date of injury, and both Claimant's right to benefits and an insurer's obligation to pay are consequently fixed under the law in effect at the time of the injury. See, e.g., Selfridge v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2002 OK CIV APP 5, , 42 P.3d 1240, 1241; Rankin v. Ford Motor Co., 1996 OK 94, , 10, 12, 925 P.2d 39, 40, 41; Parks v. Flint Steel, 1988 OK 64, -13, 755 P.2d 680, 683; Munsingwear v. Tullis, 1976 OK 187, , 557 P.2d 899, 903. So, say Petitioners, because §11(B)(5) affects a substantive change in the law governing which of several insurers are obligated to pay benefits, that section cannot be applied retroactively to alter liability for an injury occurring before its effective date. Sudbury v. Deterding, 2001 OK 10, , 19 P.3d 856, 860; Knott v. Halliburton Svcs., 1988 OK 29, , 752 P.2d 812, 813-814.
In response, OPCIGA argues that, since the 1985 amendment to 85 O.S. §43(A), which fixed the date of last hazardous exposure as the operative date for statute of limitations purposes, the date of a claimant's "awareness" of his cumulative-trauma injury is irrelevant. B.F. Goodrich v. Williams, 1988 OK 62, , 7, 755 P.2d 676, 678. So, says OPCIGA, notwithstanding Claimant's "awareness" in 2000, because Claimant was continuously exposed to the same cumulative-trauma-injury dealing hazards of the employment until August 2003, Claimant's "inchoate" claim did not accrue until filed in October 2003, two years after the October 2001 ef
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