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fective date of §11(B)(5), and that the trial court properly applied that section. Alternatively, it argues, the Legislature's 1985 amendment to §43, dispensing with the "awareness" doctrine for statute of limitations purposes, is consistent with §11(B)(5), which imposes liability without regard to "awareness," and the Legislature may properly enact legislation applicable to claims arising before the effective date where the legislative intent is so clearly expressed. See also, Norton v. C.P. Blouin, Inc., 511 A.2d 1056, 1062 (Me. 1986).
Prior to enactment of §11(B)(5), the Court of Civil Appeals recognized that, where a claimant suffered cumulative trauma injuries in successive employments, or while insured by successive insurers, apportionment of liability for the claimant's benefits was proper. See, Ball-Incon Glass v. Adams, 1995 OK CIV APP 16, 894 P.2d 439; Kerr Glass Co. v. Wilson, 1994 OK CIV APP 69, 880 P.2d 414; Lummus Const. v. Vancourt, 1992 OK CIV APP 113, 838 P.2d 43; Pauley v. Lummus Const., 1992 OK CIV APP 96, 836 P.2d 692. However, effective October 23, 2001, the Oklahoma Legislature amended 85 O.S. §11, and subsection (B)(5) now provides:
Where compensation is payable for an injury resulting from cumulative trauma, the last employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the trauma during a period of at least ninety (90) days or more, and the insurance carrier, if any, on the risk when the employee was last so exposed under such employer, shall alone be liable therefor, without right to contribution from any prior employer or insurance carrier. . . .
By enactment of §11(B)(5), "the Legislature intended to make the last exposure doctrine apply to cumulative trauma cases, both for determination of the date of injury and for the determination of the liable employer in cases of multiple employers." Celestica Inc. v. Hines, 2004 OK CIV APP 22, , 86 P.3d 1095, 1098. By force of this section, where a claimant suffers a cumulative trauma injury in the course of his or her employment for a single employer, and is last injuriously exposed to the trauma "during a period of at least ninety (90) days," "then 'the insurance carrier . . . on the risk when the employee was last so exposed . . . shall alone be liable, therefor, without right to contribution from any prior . . . insurance carrier.'" OCT Equipment, Inc. v. Ferrell, 2005 OK CIV APP 36, , ___ P.3d ___, ___, cert. den., 2005 OK 38. Application of §11(B)(5) is not impermissibly retroactive as to an insurer who assumed the risk after that section's effective date. Celestica Inc., 2004 OK CIV APP 22, , 86 P.3d at 1098.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Claimant suffered a cumulative trauma injury while working for Employer, and, although aware of the injury in March 2000, was last exposed to the cumulative trauma dealing hazards of the employment in August 2002. From and after the effective date of §11(B)(5), Claimant's "awareness" of his cumulative trauma injury was irrelevant to the determination of the "date of injury," by force of that section, determined solely by reference to the date of last exposure. Celestica Inc., 2004 OK CIV APP 22, , 86 P.3d at 1098.
Medmarc assumed the risk on or about March 1, 2002, over a year after the effective date of §11(B)(5), and was charged with notice of the law then in effect. Section 11(B)(5), at that time, imposed liability solely on "the insurance carrier . . . on the risk when the employee was last so exposed [during a period of at least ninety (90) days or more,] . . . without right to contribution from any prior . . . insurance carrier." Medmarc has suffered no increased obligation to pay greater benefits
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