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DelSanto v. Hyundai Motor Finance Co.8/12/2005
il, because the release which she signed on October 28, 1999, specifically released Gould and thereby, as a matter of law, released Hyundai. This appeal followed.
This matter first came before this Court in March, 2004, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised should not be summarily decided. At that time the Court concluded that cause had been shown, and therefore the matter was placed on the regular calendar for full briefing and oral argument.
In an order that we issued on March 19, 2004, in which we indicated our desire for full briefing, we specifically requested that, among other issues, the parties brief the following question:
"whether the language of G.L. 1956 § 31-34-4, providing that the owner and operator of 'a for hire motor vehicle * * * shall be jointly and severally liable' for damages caused by the negligence of 'any person operating the vehicle by or with the permission of the owner' is inconsistent with the language of G.L. 1956 § 31-33-6 (providing that the driver of a vehicle who causes it to be operated upon any public highway 'with the consent of the owner, or lessee, or bailee, thereof, expressed or implied * * * shall in the case of an accident be deemed to be the agent of the owner, or lessee, or bailee, of the motor vehicle') and with the language of G.L. 1956 § 10-6-2 (providing that a principal and agent are to be considered a single tortfeasor for purposes of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act)."
Thereafter, oral argument took place on December 9, 2004, and we now address the important statutory interpretation issues that this case implicates.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews a motion justice's decision to grant a summary judgment motion on a de novo basis. Martellini v. Little Angels Day Care, Inc., 847 A.2d 838, 842 (R.I. 2004); Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 859 (R.I. 1997). In carrying out that de novo review, this Court utilizes the same standards and criteriaas were employed by the motion justice; and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I. 1996); O'Hara v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 574 A.2d 135, 136 (R.I. 1990). We will affirm a summary judgment if we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743, 750 (R.I. 2004).
Analysis
For plaintiff's claim against Hyundai to remain viable after the execution of the release document that included Gould among the releasees, plaintiff must establish that Hyundai was a joint tortfeasor. The plain fact is that Hyundai is not (and never was with respect to this case) a tortfeasor or a joint tortfeasor in either the usual sense or the legal sense of those expressions.
Hyundai's liability, if any, would have come about because of a legal fiction imposed by statute pursuant to the concept of vicarious liability. See DiQuinzio, 612 A.2d at 43 ("The owner-lessor is not * * * itself a tortfeasor except by way of the legal fiction of vicarious liability.").
Yet, while Hyundai clearly was exposed (before the execution of the settlement agreement) to the possibility that it might have to pay damages, that exposure was due to the law's imposition of vicarious liability on certain entities and persons. See §§ 31-33-6 and 31-34-4. It is important to bear in mind that there is no allegation in this case that Hyundai was in any way a direct tortfeasor; no negligence or other actionable conduct by Hyundai is a
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