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DelSanto v. Hyundai Motor Finance Co.8/12/2005
lleged. Whatever liability Hyundai might have been exposed to as a result of the traffic accident would have been entirely vicarious in nature. See Oliveira v. Lombardi, 794 A.2d 453, 465 (R.I. 2002) (describing § 31-33-6 and § 31-34-4 as "vicarious-liability statutes"); see also Pridemore v. Napolitano, 689 A.2d 1053, 1056 (R.I. 1997) (" release of the servant or agent from liability for tortious conduct would serve to release the master or principal whose liability was only derivative * * *.").
It must be emphasized that the legal construct of vicarious liability does not transmogrify a non-tortfeasor into a tortfeasor. See Kinetics, Inc. v. El Paso Products Co., 653 P.2d 522, 528 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) ("Because the respondeat superior form of vicarious liability is imposed upon one party through a legal fiction, the parties are not joint tortfeasors. * * * t is elementary that the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act does not apply."); see also Theophelis v. Lansing General Hospital, 424 N.W.2d 478, 483 (Mich. 1988) (plurality opinion) ("The principal, having committed no tortious act, is not a 'tortfeasor' as that term is commonly defined."); see generally Jacobson v. Parrill, 351 P.2d 194 (Kan. 1960); Anne Arundel Medical Center, Inc. v. Condon, 649 A.2d 1189 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Estate of Williams v. Vandeberg, 620 N.W.2d 187 (S.D. 2000).
It is true that § 31-34-4 declares that the owner of a for-hire vehicle shall be "jointly and severally liable" with a person operating with permission. It must be emphasized, however, that that statutorily created potential liability is vicarious in nature; the statute does not provide that the owner of a for-hire vehicle becomes a joint tortfeasor by operation of law. As we held in DiQuinzio, the provisions of § 31-34-4 "neither create nor reflect a distinct duty of care on the part of the owner-lessor. * * * The owner-lessor is not * * * itself a tortfeasor except by way of the legal fiction of vicarious liability." DiQuinzio, 612 A.2d at 43.
In Elias v. Unisys Corp., 573 N.E.2d 946, 947-48 (Mass. 1991) the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts succinctly summarized these concepts as follows:
"Underlying the concept of joint liability is the principle that all joint (or concurrent) tortfeasors are independently at fault for their wrongful acts. For this reason § 4 of G.L. c. 231B permits a plaintiff to bring an action against one joint tortfeasor after having released another joint tortfeasor from liability. By contrast, the principles of vicarious liability apply where only the agent has committed a wrongful act. The principal is without fault. The liability of the principal arises simply by the operation of law and is only derivative of the wrongful act of the agent. * * * Because of this, established case law holds that a general release given to an agent will preclude a subsequent action against his principal."
The plaintiff could have opted to pursue a direct action against Hyundai at any point prior to the execution of the settlement agreement. Section 31-34-4 makes that possible. Once having agreed to settle with the driver, however, that statutory option was no longer available to plaintiff.
The language of § 10-6-2 is clear and unequivocal: "a master and servant or principal and agent shall be considered a single tortfeasor." We believe that this language constitutes an insuperable hurdle for the plaintiff in this case.
Conclusion
Once Donna DelSanto, acting in her capacity as Administratrix, signed the document that released Joseph Gould, Hyundai, as lessor of the vehicle that Gould was driving, ceased to be exposed to liability. Prior to the ex
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