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Selwyn v. Ward7/7/2005
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Did Defendant Owe a Duty of Reasonable Care to Plaintiff?
To prevail on a claim of negligence, "a plaintiff must establish a legally cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual loss or damage." Mills v. State Sales, Inc., 824 A.2d 461, 467-68 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Jenard v. Halpin, 567 A.2d 368, 370 (R.I. 1989)). The crux of this appeal is whether defendant owed plaintiff a legal duty, which is a question of law. Martin v. Marciano, 871 A.2d 911, 915 (R.I. 2005) (citing Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 705 (R.I. 2003)). If no such duty exists, then plaintiff's claim must fail, as a matter of law. If the evidence establishes that a duty did run from defendant to plaintiff, then plaintiff is entitled to a determination of the remaining factual questions -- did defendant breach the duty of care, and if so, was that breach the proximate cause of plaintiff's harm? See Terry v. Central Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 718 (R.I. 1999) ("Whether [defendant's] inaction amounted to a breach of the duty owed to [plaintiff] was a question of fact[,] which should have been put to the trial jury."); Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 467 (R.I. 1996) ("Ordinarily the determination of proximate cause * * * is a question of fact that should not be decided by summary judgment.").
This Court determines whether a duty exists on a "case-by-case basis," considering "'all relevant factors, including the relationship between the parties, the scope and burden of the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, public policy considerations,' * * * and the 'foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.'" Martin, 871 A.2d at 915 (quoting Volpe, 821 A.2d at 705, and Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987)). The linchpin in the analysis of whether a duty flows from a defendant to a plaintiff is foreseeability. Splendorio, 682 A.2d at 466; see Volpe, 821 A.2d at 705. As Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals said: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension." Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928); see also Hennessey v. Pyne, 694 A.2d 691, 697 (R.I. 1997). This Court has expressed this concept of limiting the scope of a defendant's duty according to risks he or she reasonably perceived, saying that a duty must be based on conduct "sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm" suffered by the plaintiff, Volpe, 821 A.2d at 705, or that "in order to temper foreseeability * * * an adequate nexus must exist between the foreseeability of [plaintiff's] harm and the actions of the defendant." Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1051 (R.I. 1994).
The plaintiff argues that the risk of the type of harm she suffered was within defendant's range of apprehension because it knew or should have known that grain alcohol is commonly used by minors to engage in fire play. The only evidence plaintiff presented to support this contention was the opinion of Dr. Paolino. However, the trial justice rejected his opinion, saying: " may well be qualified as an expert in psychiatry, in pharmacology, perhaps in treating those who suffer from substance abuse," but he is not qualified to give an opinion on whether it is foreseeable that adolescents would light grain alcohol on fire.
The admissibility of a proffered expert opinion is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial justice; absent an abuse of that discretion, this Court will not disturb the trial justice's ruling. Beaton v. Malouin, 845 A.2d 298, 301
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