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Brunson v. Long7/15/2005
torist coverage for Brunson's injuries. Specifically, Farm Bureau asserts Brunson does not meet the definition of "covered person" based on the definition of "covered person" and "you" in the policy. We agree.
"Insurance policies are subject to the general rules of contract construction." Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Carl Brazell Builders, Inc., 356 S.C. 156, 162, 588 S.E.2d 112, 115 (2003). Thus, the court must give the policy language its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Id. "The meaning of a particular word or phrase is not determined by considering the word or phrase by itself, but by reading the policy as a whole and considering the context and subject matter of the insurance contract." Stewart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 341 S.C. 143, 151, 533 S.E.2d 597, 601 (Ct. App. 2000). "When a contract is unambiguous, clear, and explicit, it must be construed according to the terms the parties have used." Hardee v. Hardee, 355 S.C. 382, 387, 585 S.E.2d 501, 503 (2003). "An insurer's obligation under a policy of insurance is defined by the terms of the policy itself and cannot be enlarged by judicial construction." South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 344 S.C. 525, 530, 544 S.E.2d 848, 850 (Ct. App. 2001). The court's function is "to enforce an insurance contract as made by the parties, and not to rewrite or to distort, under the guise of judicial construction, contracts, the terms of which are plain and unambiguous." Stewart, 341 S.C. at 151, 533 S.E.2d at 601. Therefore, the court's province is not to construe contracts broader than the parties have elected to make them or to award benefits where none were intended. Id.
Since Brunson is not a named insured on the declaration page of the policy, Brunson does not fall within the definition of "you." Furthermore, since Brunson is not a resident of her mother's household, she does not meet the definition of "family member." Because the accident at issue did not involve the 1999 Blazer, Brunson is not a covered person under sub-section (b) of the definition. Finally, no wrongful death statute is implicated, so subsection (c) is not relevant. Thus, under the clear language of the policy, Brunson does not qualify as a named insured.
The failure to define "driver listed on the vehicle" does not render the policy ambiguous in the face of the clearly defined provisions of the policy. Recently, in Ex parte United States Auto. Ass'n, Op. No. 3977 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Apr. 18, 2005) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 17 at 78), we addressed a similar issue of whether the failure to define the term "operator" in a policy created an ambiguity and determined that it did not. Id. at 83. After reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, we adopted the majority rule and held that "listing an individual as an operator on the declarations page of an insurance policy does not make that individual a named insured." Id.
Because Brunson does not fit within the parameters of the "covered person," she is not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under the policy.
2. Additional Sustaining Ground
At oral argument Brunson argued the policy was ambiguous because it failed to specify whether the relevant definitions were to be applied at the time the policy was issued or at the time of the accident. The trial court did not consider this particular issue, but because the matter is raised as an additional or alternative sustaining ground, we may consider it. I'On L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000). However, this ground is not argued in Brunson's brief and was raised for the first time at oral argument. Therefore, Brunson abandoned the additional sustaining ground by failing to raise
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