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Calaway ex rel Calaway v. Schucker12/9/2005
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the core of the certified questions presented to us in this case is whether, by virtue of Tennessee's "legal disability statute," Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-106 (2000), the plaintiff's minority tolls the three-year statute of repose for medical malpractice claims set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-116(a)(3) (2000). The action from which these Rule 23 certified questions arose was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee by Kathleen Calaway, on behalf of her minor daughter, Kaitlyn Calaway, against Jodi Schucker, M.D., on September 13, 2002. The plaintiff alleges that on February 20, 1996, the defendant performed negligently in the course of the birth and delivery of the minor plaintiff, Kaitlyn Calaway, resulting in severe and permanent injury to Kaitlyn. The plaintiff had filed a previous negligence action in 1997 in the Circuit Court for Shelby County, Tennessee, on behalf of the minor plaintiff against Shelby County Health Care Corporation, d/b/a Regional Medical Center, and the University of Tennessee Medical Group-but the defendant in the present controversy, Dr. Schucker, was not joined to that case. The parties to the earlier lawsuit settled in 2002, and a release was signed covering the defendants to that controversy but specifically reserving the plaintiff's causes of action against Dr. Schucker.
On August 4, 2004, the federal district court in the present case granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment. In partially denying the defendant's motion, the court relied on dicta in our decision in Penley v. Honda Motor Company, 31 S.W.3d 181 (Tenn. 2000). In Penley, we expressed our strong disapproval of the reasoning underlying the Tennessee Court of Appeals' decision in Bowers v. Hammond, 954 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); yet we permitted to stand its central holding that Tennessee's medical malpractice statute of repose does not supercede or suspend the operation of the legal disability statute, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-1-106, which tolls the limitations period for minority by allowing the plaintiff to bring a lawsuit within the first year of his or her majority. On this basis, the federal court denied Dr. Schucker's motion for summary judgment on all the plaintiff's claims other than for medical expenses.
But concerning the minor plaintiff's medical-expense claims, the federal court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Relying on an unreported opinion of the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee in McBride v. Shutt, No. 00-1302, 2002 W.L. 1477211 (W.D. Tenn. July 2, 2002), which in turn relied on Dudley v. Phillips, 405 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. 1966), the court concluded that because an action for a minor's medical expenses both belongs to the minor's parents and is separate and distinct from any cause of action for injuries to the child, this cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26- 116(a)(1), since it was filed beyond the statute's one-year limitations period.
The plaintiff requested that the federal court modify or amend its judgment because, in her view, it left unresolved the issue of whether the minor plaintiff could pursue an action against the defendant for medical expenses incurred after she reached majority. We have never had occasion to answer that question directly.
The defendant, given the lack of a definitive statement of law from this Court on the issue of whether Tennessee's medical malpractice statute of repose is tolled by the plaintiff's minority, also seeks clarification of our state's l
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