 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Evans v. Wintrow9/30/2005
ing Question 1(B), answered the damages question by stating that Ms. Evans had sustained $10,000 in damages as a result of Mr. Jernigan's breach.
The record, such as it is, contains no ready explanation for the jury's failure to follow the instructions in the special interrogatories, and Ms. Evans offers no explanation in her brief. In the trial court, she argued that the jury's answers to Question 1 reflect its application of the principle that a party who breaches a contract is not liable for damages if the other contracting party breached first. While this may very well be the case, there is nothing in the record to support this explanation. It is certainly not reflected in the special interrogatories, and without a transcript, it is impossible to determine which party breached first or even whether the jury instructions contained this principle of law. Accordingly, we have no choice other than to conclude that the jury's answer to Question 1(B) is invalid.
C. The Conversion Claim
Both of the parties suggested special interrogatories regarding Ms. Evans's conversion claim. Rather than selecting one of the interrogatories or preparing its own, the trial court included both questions in the special interrogatories submitted to the jury. Accordingly, Question 3 asked "Did Mr. Jernigan use Ms. Evans' money as if it was his own in denial of Ms. Evans' use of the money." Then in Question 7, the trial court asked "Did Mr. Jernigan violate the relationship with Ms. Evans by using the money for his own gain to Ms. Evans' exclusion?" The jury answered "NO" to Question 3 and "YES" to Question 7.
The trial court would have been well-advised to disregard both of these proposed questions and to fashion a clearer question based on the definition of "conversion" in T.P.I. 3 - Civil 8.65. The jury's answers to Questions 3 and 7 cannot be reconciled, and based on their inconsistency, there is no way to determine reliably whether the jury concluded that Mr. Jernigan had exercised dominion or control over Ms. Evans's property without her consent or inconsistent with her claim of title. Faced with these incongruent answers, we cannot reliably conclude that the jury found that Mr. Jernigan had converted Ms. Evans's money.
Litigants are entitled to have their rights settled by a consistent and intelligible verdict. Thus, when a judgment is based on an inconsistent verdict, the appellate courts have no choice other than to reverse the judgment and order a new trial. Concrete Spaces, Inc. v. Sender, 2 S.W.3d at 911. The jury's verdict in this case contains just the sort of irresolvable inconsistencies that undermine a jury's verdict. Accordingly, we conclude that the judgment must be reversed and that the case be remanded for a new trial.
V.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial. We tax the costs of this appeal in equal proportions to Robert S. Jernigan and his surety and to Minna E. H. Evans for which execution, if necessary, may issue.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Tennessee Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|