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Duncan v. Lloyd8/18/2005
This dispute arises from a 2000 automobile accident. At approximately 3:00 AM on September 10, 2000, Defendant Rose M. Lloyd (Ms. Lloyd) was traveling southbound in the northbound shoulder of Clarksville Highway while delivering newspapers for The Tennessean Newspaper ("The Tennessean"). Plaintiff Rhonda D. Duncan was traveling north in the northbound lane and saw the headlights of Ms. Lloyd's vehicle coming toward her. Believing Ms. Lloyd was coming toward her in her lane of traffic, Ms. Duncan swerved to the shoulder and struck Ms. Lloyd's vehicle.
In May 2001, Ms. Duncan filed an action against Ms. Lloyd seeking damages for personal injury and property damage. In her complaint, Ms. Duncan alleged damages including lost wages, medical expenses, pain and suffering, and permanent disability. Ms. Duncan also named The Tennessean as a Defendant under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Ms. Duncan sought damages of $100,000.
Ms. Lloyd and The Tennessean (collectively, Defendants) answered in June and August 2001, respectively. In their answers, Defendants denied any negligence and alleged that Ms. Lloyd's vehicle was completely off the traveled portion of Clarksville Highway and stopped or nearly stopped when it was struck by Ms. Duncan. They asserted Ms. Duncan slammed on her brakes, skidded, lost control of her vehicle, left the roadway, and struck Ms. Lloyd's vehicle. Defendants asserted negligence and negligence per se on the part of Ms. Duncan as an affirmative defense, and submitted that Ms. Duncan was operating under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. They further submitted that the accident was not the proximate cause of Ms. Duncan's injuries and that Ms. Duncan was not less than 50% at fault and, therefore, could not recover. In the alternative, Defendants pled comparative fault.
On December 2, 2003, Ms. Lloyd served Ms. Duncan with a request for admissions. Ms. Duncan failed to respond or to request an extension of time to respond within thirty days as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 36.01. On January 13, 2004, Ms. Lloyd filed a statement of undisputed facts and moved for summary judgment. In her motion, Ms. Lloyd asserted that, because Ms. Duncan had failed to respond to her December request for admissions, under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 36.01 the requests were deemed admitted. The Tennessean adopted Ms. Lloyd's statement of undisputed facts and moved for summary judgment on February 2, 2004.
On January 16, 2004, Ms. Duncan filed a hand-written response to Ms. Lloyd's request for admissions. On February 17, 2004, Ms. Duncan filed a response to Defendants' motions for summary judgment, but did not include a statement of disputed facts. Ms. Duncan filed a portion of her deposition, excerpted answers to Ms. Lloyd's request for admissions, and a copy of the police diagram of the accident with her response. In her response, Ms. Duncan asserted that the answers to Ms. Lloyd's request for admissions were delivered to Ms. Lloyd before Ms. Duncan was served with Ms. Lloyd's motion for summary judgment.
A hearing on the matter was scheduled for March 19, 2004. On March 17, Ms. Duncan submitted a brief pointing to a factual dispute regarding the direction in which Ms. Lloyd's vehicle was traveling at the time of the accident, and asserting that the plain language of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 36.01 permits the trial court to extend the time in which a party may respond to a request for admissions. On the same day, Ms. Duncan moved the court to allow the filing of her response to Ms. Lloyd's request for admission. Also on March 17, Ms. Lloyd moved the court to strike Ms. Duncan's March 17 brief from
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