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Duncan v. Lloyd8/18/2005
g them by the opposing party. Holland v. Memphis, 125 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)(perm. app. denied). Accordingly, failure to file a response in opposition to a motion for summary judgment generally will prove fatal in the trial court and upon appeal. Id.
We begin our analysis by noting that this is not a case in which the non-moving party has failed to respond to a motion for summary judgment altogether, or has simply attempted to rely on the pleadings. Rather, this case raises the question of how specific a response must be in order to fulfill the requirements of Rule 56.
The only issue addressed by Ms. Duncan in her response to Ms. Lloyd's motion for summary judgment and statement of undisputed facts is that of the location of Ms. Lloyd's vehicle at the time of the accident. Ms. Duncan stated that she had answered twice under oath that Ms. Lloyd was not in the southbound lane of traffic as asserted by Ms. Lloyd in her statement of undisputed facts. Ms. Duncan referred the court to the "attached answer to interrogatories (excerpted) and the portion of the deposition . . . which deal with causation . . . . together with the diagram, drawn by a Metro Police Officer at the scene . . . ." Although Ms. Duncan did not file a separate statement of undisputed facts, she submitted the referenced excerpted portions of her deposition and answers to requests for admissions with her response. We believe that this response, together with the attached excerpted portion of Ms. Duncan's deposition and the police diagram, was sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding the location of Ms. Lloyd's vehicle at the time of the accident.
However, Ms. Duncan's response is not sufficient to dispute the remaining facts asserted by Ms. Lloyd in her statement of undisputed facts. These include that Ms. Duncan had consumed alcohol prior to the collision; that Ms. Lloyd's vehicle was entirely on the shoulder; that Ms. Lloyd's vehicle was at or near a complete stop at the time of the collision; that, according to Ms. Duncan's deposition, Ms. Duncan had no knowledge of where Ms. Lloyd's vehicle was located when she first saw it; that Ms. Duncan had advised a treating physician that she was traveling at 65 miles per hour when the collision occurred; that the speed limit on Clarksville Pike in the area where the collision occurred is 55 miles per hour; that Ms. Duncan told the investigating police office that she was not injured in the accident and that Ms. Duncan refused an ambulance at the scene of the accident; that, according to the records of a treating physician, any physical complaints from which Ms. Duncan suffers have been worsened by depression; and that Ms. Duncan voluntarily terminated her employment and her failure to return to employment is not related to any physical complaints from the collision. These facts were not addressed by Ms. Duncan in her response to Ms. Lloyd's Rule 56 motion. Accordingly, they are deemed admitted.
Ms. Duncan argues here and in the trial court that her response to Ms. Lloyd's Rule 36 request for admissions, which she contends was provided to Ms. Lloyd before Ms. Lloyd moved for summary judgment, is sufficient to demonstrate disputed facts. This argument simply fails to appreciate the requirements of Rule 56. As the trial court took pains to explain, regardless of whether Ms. Duncan fulfilled the requirements of Rule 36 regarding the request for admissions, her response to Ms. Lloyd's motion for summary judgment is insufficient to satisfy Rule 56, which governs motions for summary judgment. Merely informing the trial court that the record demonstrates disputed facts, without specifically addressing those facts in the response a
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