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Duncan v. Lloyd8/18/2005
nd specifically citing to portions of the record evidencing dispute, does not satisfy Rule 56. Any fact not specifically disputed with citations to the record to support the alleged dispute may be deemed admitted.
Our analysis of whether summary judgment was appropriate in light of the insufficiency of Ms. Duncan's response to Ms. Lloyd's motion for summary judgment does not end here, however. As noted, Ms. Duncan successfully demonstrated a dispute regarding the location of Ms. Lloyd's vehicle at the time of the accident, which is clearly a genuine issue of material fact. Further, at the hearing of the matter, Ms. Lloyd conceded that, contrary to the statement contained in her request for admissions, Ms. Lloyd was traveling south on the northbound shoulder (as alleged by Ms. Duncan) and not on the southbound shoulder.
Thus, the facts which are admitted or deemed admitted for the purposes of the summary judgment motion are:
Ms. Lloyd was traveling south in the northbound shoulder of Clarksville Highway at approximately 3:00 AM on September 10, 2000.
Ms. Lloyd's vehicle was entirely on the shoulder.
Ms. Lloyd's vehicle was at or near a complete stop at the time of the collision.
The speed limit on Clarksville Pike in the area where the collision occurred is 55 miles per hour.
Ms. Duncan advised a treating physician that she was traveling at 65 miles per hour when the collision occurred.
Ms. Duncan had consumed alcohol prior to the collision.
According to Ms. Duncan's deposition, Ms. Duncan had no knowledge of where Ms. Lloyd's vehicle was located when she first saw it.
Ms. Duncan told the investigating police office that she was not injured in the accident and she refused an ambulance at the scene of the accident.
According to the records of a treating physician, any physical complaints from which Ms. Duncan suffers have been worsened by depression.
Ms. Duncan voluntarily terminated her employment and her failure to return to employment is not related to any physical complaints from the collision.
We next turn to the trial court's determination that no reasonable jury would find that Ms. Duncan was not at least fifty percent at fault in light of these facts and that, accordingly, Ms. Duncan could not recover. We agree with the trial court. Additionally, The Tennessean cannot be found liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior where no liability has attached to its employee.
Holding
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court awarding summary judgment to Defendants. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Rhonda D. Duncan, and her surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.
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