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Crook v. Jock7/13/2005
I.
In this appeal, we must determine whether the record supports the trial court's entry of a consent order of dismissal.
Plaintiffs/Appellants Ronald E. Crook and Doyle B. Crook, Sr. (collectively "Plaintiffs"), acting pro se, contend that they never consented or repudiated their consent to the terms of a consent order of dismissal prior to the entry of judgment. Defendant/Appellee Angela R. Jock ("Defendant"), however, contends that the parties reached a settlement of the matter, and Plaintiffs agreed to the terms of the order after being given an opportunity to examine the decree. The record of the relevant proceedings in this case is in the form of a statement of the evidence. However, because there is such inherent and irreconcilable conflict between the material facts provided in the statement of the evidence, we find it necessary to vacate the judgment of the trial court.
This dispute began when Plaintiffs brought an action for recovery of a debt in General Sessions Court for Shelby County against Defendant. The General Sessions Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, and Defendant appealed to the Circuit Court. On the date set for trial and at the trial judge's direction, Mr. Ronald Crook and counsel for Defendant convened in a nearby jury room to discuss a settlement of this matter. The parties apparently emerged from this settlement conference with a tentative agreement. However, the exact terms of that agreement are not entirely clear from the record. More importantly, the events that transpired between the settlement conference and the entry of the final judgment one week later are unclear from the statement of the evidence.
Following the trial court's entry of the purported consent decree, Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal. The trial court subsequently entered an order granting Defendant's objection to Plaintiffs' statement of the evidence, thereby adopting Defendant's statement of the evidence. Because this case hinges on the facts surrounding the entry of the consent decree as presented in the statement of the evidence, we feel it is necessary to restate those facts almost in their entirety as provided in the statement of the evidence. The approved statement of the evidence provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The following facts are provided by Plaintiff:
1. In the Fall of 2002, Plaintiff filed a civil [suit] against his ex-friend, Angela R. Jock. The amount of the Complaint was just under $3,000.00 and included loans to her that she refused to repay, and non-paid back-rent owed to Plaintiff's father in the amount of $1,400.00. Due [to the] fact that Plaintiff's father is the owner of the home in which Plaintiff rented a private room for $200.00 monthly, in November 2002, Plaintiff added his father, Doyle B. Crook, Sr., to the suit as an indispensable party. At that point in time, neither party had retained legal counsel.
2. The General Sessions trial took place on December 12, 2002. . . . The Court's decision, accordingly, was an award of over $1,500.00 in favor of the Plaintiff. . . .
3. The Defendant proceeded to file a timely appeal under a pauper's oath.
5. January 5, 2004 was the trial date. . . . Plaintiff brought with him to Court on the 5th a motion for continuance for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff's father was ill and could not be present, and (2) Plaintiff was prepared to inform the Court that [counsel for Defendant] had not replied to Plaintiff's many voice mails and letters suggesting that they meet and mediate. In Court, Plaintiff did not mention his father's absence, but did ask that counsels discuss possible compromises. Judge Brown
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