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Phillips v. Dow Chemical Co.11/30/2005
ther as husband and wife, agreeing to be married, and representing to others that a marriage relationship existed. See Villegas, 975 S.W.2d at 749. He refers to Stewart's death certificate, which lists Phillips as her spouse, their income-tax records, and evidence that he received worker's compensation benefits as her spouse. As Villegas recognizes, however, the parties to an allegedly common-law marriage are impeded from establishing that relationship, as Phillips is here, by proof of an existing marriage that has not been terminated by death, divorce, or annulment. See id. at 749--50.
Phillips also contends that his belief that his prior marriage had ended by divorce gives rise to triable issues for a jury's determination. Although Phillips cites no authority to support his contention, this Court held, in Dodd, that a mistaken belief that a marriage had ended does not present a factual dispute on the issue whether a common-law marriage exists. 17 S.W.3d at 716.
Phillips also asserts that he is a putative spouse, whose most recent "marriage," to Stewart, is presumptively valid under the Family Code. Phillips relies on the presumption stated in Family Code section 1.102. "When two or more marriages of a person to different spouses are alleged, the most recent marriage is presumed to be valid as against each marriage that precedes the most recent marriage . . . ." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 1.102 (Vernon 1998). Phillips's arguments ignore that proof that a prior marriage is valid destroys the presumption. See id. Appellees defeated the presumption that Phillips's alleged marriage to Stewart was valid through the sworn answer that Phillips filed in the Alabama divorce action. As addressed above, Phillips's sworn answer in that action admitted the fact of the prior marriage and referred to the former spouse who filed that action as his wife.
Phillips also defends his status as Stewart's surviving spouse by relying on the decrees of the Galveston County Probate Court, which declared that he is Stewart's husband and heir. Phillips argues that appellees are collaterally estopped from contesting that determination. We begin by noting that the trial court properly addressed the spousal issue because standing is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443. It is well-settled that the standing of claimants who assert survivor or wrongful-death rights is determined by the statutes governing those claims. See Garza v. Maverick Market, Inc. 768 S.W.2d 273, 275--276 (Tex. 1989); Buster v. Metro. Trans. Auth., 835 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tex. App.---Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
Although the record shows that the probate court declared that Phillips is Stewart's husband and heir, neither the trial court nor appellees is bound by that determination. Collateral estoppel principles did not apply to preclude appellees' challenge to Phillips's standing, because no appellee was a party to the probate-court proceeding. See State & County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Miller, 52 S.W.3d 693, 696 (Tex. 2001) (noting that party to second lawsuit may invoke collateral estoppel to bar second lawsuit on grounds of party's involvement in first lawsuit that actually litigated issue that was essential to judgment in first lawsuit and identical to issue in second lawsuit). But, conversely, because Phillips was a party to the Alabama court decree that dissolved his earlier marriage, see id., collateral estoppel principles preclude his contesting the dissolution of his prior marriage by that decree.
Phillips also asserts that the affirmative defense of lâches bars all challenges to his status as Stewart's surviving spouse because the challenges came too la
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