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State v. Oakley12/16/2005
ns so long as claims are processed and paid in a timely manner. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ยง 103.003.
Based on the plain language of the statute and case law interpreting a similar provision in the tort claims act, we hold that section 103.153 does not bar this suit because Ochoa's previous settlement of federal claims was not brought under chapter 103. We overrule the State's third issue.
Conclusion
We hold that the waiver of sovereign immunity in chapter 103 of the civil practices and remedies code includes a suit brought by an assignee of a wrongfully convicted person, that common-law principles permit assignment of such claims, and that the statute does not prohibit a suit by a person who has previously obtained compensation from another governmental unit not based on chapter 103. Having overruled all of the State's issues, we affirm the trial court's denial of the State's plea to the jurisdiction.
Before Justices B. A. Smith, Patterson and Puryear: Opinion by Justice B. A. Smith; Dissenting Opinion by Justice Puryear
Affirmed
DISSENTING OPINION
Because I disagree with the majority's determination that Ochoa's wrongful imprisonment claim can be assigned to Danziger, I respectfully dissent.
In this case, we must start with the premise that Texas cannot "be sued in her own courts without her consent, and then only in the manner indicated by that consent." Hosner v. De Young, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847), quoted in Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 (Tex. 2003). The State may relinquish its sovereign immunity, if at all, in "varying degrees," and the legislature "is better suited to balance the conflicting policy issues associated with waiving immunity." Wichita Falls, 106 S.W.3d at 695. I believe that the question of whether assignment is a necessary extension of the right created by this statute involves policy considerations better left for the legislature. Further, because the legislature may waive immunity in "varying degrees," the legislature's waiver of immunity as to "the person entitled" to relief after wrongful imprisonment does not necessarily mean that the legislature also intended to waive immunity as to someone purportedly holding an assignment of that right.
The State is immune both from suit and from liability, and even if the State "acknowledges liability on a claim," it does not necessarily follow that the State waived immunity from suit. Id. at 696. In evaluating whether immunity has been waived, we consider several factors. Id. at 697. First, waiver must be "beyond doubt." Id. Second, we resolve ambiguities in favor of immunity, and if the statute leaves room for doubt, we "are less likely to find a waiver." Id. Third, we must consider whether the legislature provided by statute for an "objective limitation on the State's potential liability." Id. at 698.
Even if immunity from suit is waived, it is important to remember that the rule requiring a clear and unambiguous waiver applies both to the existence and to the extent of the waiver. City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 297 (Tex. 1995); see Wichita Falls, 106 S.W.3d at 696. However, " he clear and unambiguous requirement is not an end in itself, but merely a method to guarantee that courts adhere to legislative intent. Therefore, the doctrine should not be applied mechanically to defeat the true purpose of the law." Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. 2000). In other words, we cannot apply the "clear and unambiguous rule" so rigidly as to defeat the "almost certain intent" of the legislature. Id. (quoting Barfield, 898 S.W.2d at 292). We may not interpr
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