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Morrell v. Finke11/3/2005
, because of her motor, fine motor and visual motor problems, that she needs physical therapy because of her gross motor problems and balance problems, that she needs language therapy or its sometimes called speech therapy for her language problems, that it seems that she requires therapy or consultation from a person who specializes in parenting skills or behavior management.
Dr. Silver testified that Madeline would not have these impairments "if her brain weren't damaged in some way."
This evidence sufficiently supports the Morrells' claim for Madeline's past medical expenses by establishing that the expenses were reasonable and were necessary for Madeline to incur as a result of her brain injury . Moreover, unless the record demonstrates otherwise, we must presume that the jury followed the instruction in the court's charge to only compensate the Morrells for reasonable and necessary expenses they incurred for the injuries to Madeline. See Tesfa v. Stewart, 135 S.W.3d 272, 278-79 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied); see also Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 771 (Tex. 2003); Turner, Collie & Braden, Inc. v. Brookhollow, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 160, 167 (Tex. 1982). The record does not indicate that the jury disregarded this instruction and awarded unreasonable or unnecessary past medical expenses.
The jury's award of $160,000 in past medical expenses is supported by the evidence and is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. We hold that the evidence supporting the jury's award of past medical expenses is factually sufficient; we are not at liberty to order a remittitur. Larson v. Cactus Util. Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1987); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Odem, 929 S.W.2d 513, 528 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (op. on reh'g). We overrule Dr. Finke and the clinic's fourth issue.
3. Future Medical Expenses
Defendants claim that the jury's award of future medical expenses is excessive because Plaintiffs' expert on future-medical-expenses damages failed to reduce her damages testimony to present value. Alternatively, they seek a remittitur. The jury was instructed in special question number 3 to determine " hat sum of money, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate MADELINE MORRELL for her injures, if any, resulting from the negligence you have found in answer to Question No. 1 of this charge." Item B set forth under special question 3 instructed the jury to consider,
The reasonable and necessary expenses for attendant care/custodial care, nursing care, medicine, institutional care, physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, durable medical goods, and transportation that, in reasonable probability Madeline Morrell will sustain in the future after she reaches the age of eighteen (18) years.
Virgina Stegent, Plaintiffs' life-care planner, testified that Madeline's future medical expenses would require between $4.2 million and $5.4 million "in today's dollars." Defendants' expert testified that the present value of Madeline's future medical expenses was $1.49 million. The jury found the present value of Madeline's future medical expenses to be $3.5 million, an amount that basically split the difference between Defendants' $1.5 million calculation and Plaintiffs' $5.4 million calculation.
Ms. Stegent's testimony, provided in terms of "today's dollars," does constitute a reduction to present value. See, e.g., In re Hailey, 792 N.E.2d 851,861 n.9 (Ind. 2003) (defining present value as the total sum of future payments based upon the plaintiff's projected life expectancy discounted to reduce the sum to
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