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Kroupa v. Casey12/8/2005
In dual proceedings, appellant-relator, David J. Kroupa, D.C. ("Kroupa"), challenges the trial court's order that denied his motion to compel arbitration against appellee-real party in interest, Ernest Casey ("Casey"). In one issue, Kroupa contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to compel arbitration. We dismiss the interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction and conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.
Background
In early 2003, Casey received chiropractic treatment from Kroupa at Kroupa's office in Houston. On August 20, 2003, Casey sued Kroupa, alleging that Kroupa had been negligent and grossly negligent by (1) failing to properly evaluate Casey; (2) failing to take X-rays before treatment; and (3) giving improper chiropractic manipulation. Kroupa responded by filing an original answer and a motion to compel arbitration. On September 1, 2004, Kroupa filed his first amended motion to compel arbitration, seeking arbitration pursuant to both the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") and the Texas Arbitration Act ("TAA"). On January 6, 2005, the trial court denied Kroupa's first amended motion to compel arbitration. After Kroupa filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order, the trial court held a second hearing, during which the court expressed concern with sending a medical malpractice case to arbitration. On February 17, 2005, the trial court signed a second order that denied Kroupa's Motion for Reconsideration of Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration. We stayed all trial proceedings on April 26, 2005. Kroupa now challenges the trial court's order via an interlocutory appeal and a petition for writ of mandamus.
Appeal
The TAA and the FAA provide alternative procedural vehicles for relief. In re Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 14 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Tex. App.---Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, orig. proceeding). If the trial court's denial of arbitration is based on the TAA, the order is subject to interlocutory appeal. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.098(a)(1) (Vernon 2005). Relief from a denial of arbitration under the FAA must be pursued by mandamus. EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias, 934 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
The trial court did not expressly determine whether the FAA or the TAA applies. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 171.001-.098 (Vernon 2005). However, the parties' contract provides that "any dispute as to medical malpractice . . . will be determined by submission to arbitration as provided by state and federal law," and the Supreme Court of Texas and this Court have both approved application of the FAA when a contract "relates to" interstate commerce and the parties agree that federal law applies. See In re Firstmerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding); see also In re Tenet Healthcare, LTD, 84 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Tex. App.---Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, orig. proceeding). As a threshold matter, we first determine which act applies.
The FAA governs a written arbitration clause in any contract "evidencing a transaction involving commerce." See 9 U.S.C. § 2. This provision extends to all transactions affecting commerce and is coextensive with the reach of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277, 115 S.Ct. 834, 838--43 (1995); see In re L & L Kempwood Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 125, 127 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding). A contract "evidenc a transaction involving commerce" if it in fact turns out to involve interstate commerce. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277--81, 115 S.Ct. at 841--43.
The FAA displaces state law only to the extent that the stat
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