 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
HCRA of Texas11/3/2005
putations alleging or demonstrating that the judgment's award is incorrect. HCRA points out that the judgment does not explain its computation of prejudgment interest nor indicate the date on which prejudgment interest began to run; we hold that HCRA's mere assertion that the computation is incorrect does not establish trial court error. We overrule this portion of HCRA's eighth issue.
The balance of HCRA's eighth and ninth issues challenge the judgment's ten percent postjudgment interest award. HCRA argues that House Bill 2415's amendments to the finance code apply to this case so that the postjudgment interest rate should be five percent. HCRA did not raise a complaint about the judgment's interest rate or argue the applicability of House Bill 2415 in any timely filed postjudgment motion. HCRA timely filed a motion for new trial, and in the alternative, a suggestion for remittitur and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. But neither of these documents challenged the interest rate utilized in the judgment or argued that the amendments to the finance code effectuated by House Bill 2415 were applicable. HCRA did raise the interest issue in a supplemental motion for new trial, but the supplemental motion was not timely filed--it was filed forty-seven days after the judgment was signed--so it is a nullity and preserves nothing for our review. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a), (b) (requiring motion for new trial and amended motion for new trial to be filed within thirty days of date of judgment); Moritz v. Preiss, 121 S.W.3d 715, 720 (Tex. 2003) (holding untimely filed amended motion for new trial is a nullity for purposes of preserving issues for appellate review); Pringle v. Moon, 158 S.W.3d 607, 612 n.2 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding argument that House Bill 2415's effective date applied instead of House Bill 4's effective date was waived if not raised in trial court). Consequently, the postjudgment interest arguments set forth in the balance of HCRA's eighth issue and in its ninth issue are not preserved for our review. We overrule those issues.
VI. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In its second, third, and fourth issues, respectively, HCRA challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding that HCRA's negligence proximately caused an injury to Lloyd, the jury's economic and non-economic damage awards, and the jury's finding that the harm to Lloyd resulted from malice attributable to HCRA.
A. Standards of Review
1. Legal Sufficiency
In determining a "no evidence" issue we are to consider only the evidence and inferences that tend to support the finding of the disputed fact--unless a reasonable juror could not give credit to such evidence or inferences. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We are to disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary to the disputed fact--unless a reasonable juror could not disregard such evidence or inferences. Id. But we are not to weigh the evidence or make our own credibility determinations. Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2001); Cont'l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex. 1996); In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951). Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding. Cont'l Coffee, 937 S.W.2d at 450; Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex. 1996). More than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence furnishes some reasonable basis for differing conclusions by reasonable minds about the existence of a vital fact. Rocor Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 77 S.W.3d 253, 262 (Tex. 2002).
2. Factual Suf
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Texas Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|