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HCRA of Texas11/3/2005
ed; that he was treated for dehydration, malnutrition, and decubitus ulcers; and that blood work and other tests were performed. No evidence exists that this treatment and these tests were necessitated by ischemic colitis. In fact, Lloyd was not diagnosed with ischemic colitis until it was noted on his death certificate after an autopsy.
It is true that a plaintiff may not force a defendant to pay his medical expenses for treatment of a pre-existing condition not caused by the defendant's negligence. See Texarkana Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Murdock, 946 S.W.2d 836, 840 (Tex. 1997) (holding plaintiff may recover only for medical expenses from treatment made necessary defendant's negligence where differentiation is possible between treatment made necessary by defendant and treatment for pre-existing conditions). Here, however, the jury found that the purported pre-existing injuries--that is, dehydration, malnutrition, and decubitus ulcers--were proximately caused by HCRA's negligence. Accord Linan v. Rosales, 155 S.W.3d 298, 306 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2004, pet. denied) (recognizing defendant not responsible for costs associated with pre-existing cancer but only for increased costs necessitated by alleged negligent delay in diagnosis). We overrule the portion of HCRA's third issue challenging the jury's damage award for $17,805 in medical expenses.
Next, HCRA contends that legally and factually insufficient evidence exists to support the jury's award of $75,000 to Lloyd's estate for the physical pain and mental anguish he suffered prior to his death. Lloyd was conscious during his entire stay at HCRA. Mr. Hunter Mack Baldridge, the administrator at HCRA, testified that he has seen decubitus ulcers and that they are nasty and look painful. The emergency room personnel documented Lloyd's two decubitus ulcers as stage three, neucrotic, and oozing blood. Lloyd's family members testified that Lloyd complained that his back hurt him.
The process of awarding damages for amorphous, discretionary injuries such as mental anguish or pain and suffering is inherently difficult because the alleged injury is a subjective, unliquidated, non-pecuniary loss. Dollison v. Hayes, 79 S.W.3d 246, 249 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2002, no pet.). The presence or absence of pain, either physical or mental, is an inherently subjective question. Id. No objective measures exist for analyzing pain and suffering damages. See Hicks v. Ricardo, 834 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ). Once the existence of some pain and suffering has been established, however, there is no objective way to measure the adequacy of the amount awarded as compensation . Dawson v. Briggs, 107 S.W.3d 739, 751 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
A party may establish the existence of conscious pain and suffering by circumstantial evidence. Borth v. Charley's Concrete Co., 139 S.W.3d 391, 395 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 492 (Tex. Civ. App.--Texarkana 1978, no writ). Pain and suffering may be inferred or presumed as a consequence of severe injuries. Borth, 139 S.W.3d at 395; City of Austin v. Selter, 415 S.W.2d 489, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The duration of the pain and mental anguish is an important consideration. Sunbridge Healthcare Corp. v. Penny, 160 S.W.3d 230, 250 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2005, no pet.). The jury is given a great deal of discretion in awarding an amount of damages it deems appropriate for pain and suffering. Texarkana Mem'l Hosp., 946 S.W.2d at 841; Dollison, 79 S.W.3d at 249. Despite this broad discretion, there must "be some evidence to justify the amount awarded," as a jury "cannot simply pick a number and put it in the
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