 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
In re Weekley Homes10/28/2005
not compel arbitration by merely pleading a claim that quotes someone else's contract. The nonparties in FirstMerit Bank were the daughter and son-in-law of the signatories, the actual occupants of the mobile home, and (according to the briefs) the future owners to whom the signatories planned to transfer title. It is hard to see what direct benefits they expected from that contract that Von Bargen did not expect from this one.
Like the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel, we do not understand direct-benefits estoppel to create liability for noncontracting parties that does not otherwise exist. As Von Bargen and Weekley had no contract between them, estoppel alone cannot grant either a right to sue for breach. Nor do we understand the doctrine to apply when the benefits alleged are insubstantial or indirect. But once Von Bargen deliberately sought substantial and direct benefits from the contract, and Weekley agreed to comply, equity prevents her from avoiding the arbitration clause that was part of that agreement.
We recognize that direct-benefits estoppel has yet to be endorsed by the United States Supreme Court, and that its application and boundaries are not entirely clear. For example, while federal courts often state the test as whether a nonsignatory has "embraced the contract," the metaphor gives little guidance in deciding what particular conduct embraces or merely shakes hands with it. Indeed, the equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate, requiring trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each case.
But we agree with the federal courts that when a nonparty consistently and knowingly insists that others treat it as a party, it cannot later "turn its back on the portions of the contract, such as an arbitration clause, that it finds distasteful." A nonparty cannot both have his contract and defeat it too.
While Von Bargen never based her personal injury claim on the contract, her prior exercise of other contractual rights and her equitable entitlement to other contractual benefits prevents her from avoiding the arbitration clause here. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to compel arbitration. We conditionally grant the writ of mandamus and order the trial court to vacate that part of its order denying Weekley's motion, and to enter a new order compelling arbitration of Von Bargen 's claim. We are confident the trial court will comply, and our writ will issue only if it does not.
Scott Brister Justice
Page 1 2 3 4 Texas Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|