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Loftin v. Morales12/14/2005
h a third party. See id. at 585. With the exception of stating that they slowed down in Shadybrook, the officers said little about road conditions or the impact of rough, narrow roads with poor visibility. See id. at 586. Further, the officers' lack of familiarity with the streets is a factor to be considered. See id.
We recognize that in applying the good faith test, we are not to penalize an officer for his inability to perceive or evaluate a risk due to circumstances beyond his control and that officers are not necessarily forbidden from pursuing suspects for traffic violations or in residential areas. See id. at 583. Additionally, an officer's inability to thoroughly analyze each need or risk factor should not alone prevent him from establishing good faith. See id. Nevertheless, we conclude that neither Loftin nor Evans adequately addressed the degree, likelihood, and obviousness of the risks created by the twenty-seven minute high speed chase. See Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467.
We are required to take as true evidence favorable to the non-movant, indulge reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, and resolve doubts in favor of the non-movant. See Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49. After noting that the Probe was traveling seventy-four miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone and surmising that the vehicle might be stolen, the officers began what would turn out to be an unfruitful and injurious twenty-seven minute chase. While we are aware that the work of law enforcement is difficult and officers must make decisions under arduous circumstances, we cannot agree that Appellants met their burden under the facts of this case. Appellants' evidence did not establish as a matter of law that a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that the need to immediately apprehend the speeding suspect outweighed a clear risk of harm to the public in continuing the pursuit in the residential area. See Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 581.
Conclusion
We cannot say that Appellants established their entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying their motion for summary judgment. We overrule Appellants' sole issue.
We affirm the trial court's order.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Ramey, Retired Chief Justice, Twelfth Court of Appeals, Tyler, sitting by assignment.
(PUBLISH)
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