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Toshiba Machine Co.11/10/2005
ts claims. The difference is significant; using the earlier date yields an additional $493,000 in prejudgment interest.
Prejudgment interest accrues on the amount of a judgment during a period that begins on the earlier of the 180th day after the date a defendant receives written notice of a claim against it, or the date the suit is filed. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 304.104 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Although section 304.101 states that " his subchapter applies only to a wrongful death, personal injury , or property damage case," the Supreme Court of Texas has extended the notice provision of section 304.104 to all claims. Id. § 304.101; Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 531 (Tex. 1998).
A "claim" under section 304.104 is a demand for compensation or an assertion of a right to be paid. MCN Energy Enters., Inc. v. Omagro de Colombia, L.D.C., 98 S.W.3d 766, 773 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). A claim need not demand an exact amount or list every element of damage. Bevers v. Soules, 909 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
1. Standard of Review
Before we turn to the merits of SPM's issue, we must determine what standard of review to apply. In MCN Energy Enterprises, we wrote that " he date from which statutory prejudgment interest should begin is a question of law that an appellate court must review de novo." 98 S.W.3d at 773. We cited as authority for that proposition Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 655-56 (Tex. 1989). Johnson did not concern prejudgment interest; instead, it stands for the general proposition that "matters of statutory construction are questions of law for the court to decide rather than issues of fact." Id. at 656. Implicit in Johnson, and necessary to bridge the gap between Johnson and MCN Energy Enterprises, is the rule that appellate courts review questions of law de novo. See, e.g., Graves v. Alders, 132 S.W.3d 12, 17 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2004, pet. denied).
On the other hand, we held that " trial court's award of prejudgment interest is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard" in Manufacturers Auto Leasing , Inc. v. Autoflex Leasing, Inc., 139 S.W.3d 342, 348 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). Our sister courts generally hold the same.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals described the standard of review this way:
We review a trial court's award of prejudgment interest under the abuse of discretion standard. [Citation omitted.] Under this standard, we will not disturb a trial court's findings on factual issues unless the court reasonably could have reached only one decision and it failed to do so. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992). However, "a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts." Id. at 840.
J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co. v. Heinrich, 32 S.W.3d 280, 289 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2000, pet. denied). We conclude that Heinrich correctly articulates the general standard for reviewing an award of prejudgment interest. The abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court's factual findings as they relate to prejudgment interest; but the de novo standard applies to the trial court's application of the law to the facts.
In the case before us, the trial court's award of prejudgment interest does not hinge on any factual finding. Instead, the issue turns on the interpretation of a single letter from SPM to Toshiba. The existence and contents of the letter are not in dispute. The question is whether the letter constituted notice of SPM's claims as a matter of law. Therefore, as a practical matter, our review of the prejudgm
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