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Kincaid v. Austin Center for Outpatient Surgery11/4/2005
Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(l). Therefore, the district court was required to grant HealthSouth's motion to dismiss.See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(e), (l).Accordingly, we overrule Kincaid's first issue.
In her second issue, Kincaid argues that the expert report adequately addresses all elements required under section 13.01(r)(6), including causation. Alternatively, she claims that the report incorporated medical records that address causation. Lunday's report first addresses causation by stating, " t is clear from the record that the complications from the surgery stem directly from the discharge nurse not communicating to the patient that she should avoid lying on her back." Lunday further opines that " his omitted instruction falls below the standard of care expected of nurses in similar situations, and the failure to meet the standard of care caused Mrs. Kincaid to engage in an activity which increased the intraocular pressure, the need for subsequent day surgery and Mrs. Kincaid's poor outcome."
Like the statements regarding causation in Wright, Lunday's statements are conclusory because they fail to provide sufficient information linking Kincaid's injuries (the increased pressure, next day surgery, and poor outcome) to HealthSouth's alleged breach of omitting the instruction. See 79 S.W.3d at 53. Lunday's report does not state how omitting the instruction actually brought about the injuries to Kincaid's eye, nor does the report address how Kincaid's eye condition would have progressed or been treated if the instruction had been given. See Costello, 141 S.W.3d at 248. The report does not even specify the nature of Kincaid's "poor outcome" or "complications from surgery." Lunday merely concludes that HealthSouth's behavior caused a poor outcome and complications from surgery.
Without any other information connecting Lunday's conclusions to HealthSouth's alleged breach, the report is conclusory and fails to present the causal relationship required by section 13.01(r)(6). See Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 53. Unlike the case Kincaid cites for support, the report here does not have other items of specific and relevant information preceding the conclusory statements on causation. See Petrus-Bradshaw v. Dulemba, 158 S.W.3d 630, 633-34 (Tex. App.--Forth Worth 2005, no pet.). Moreover, incorporation of external medical records showing causation is flatly prohibited under the four corners rule that governs article 4590i expert reports. See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878.
Because Lunday's report is conclusory, it did not inform HealthSouth of the specific conduct at issue or give the district court any basis to conclude that Kincaid's claim had merit. See id. Although Kincaid only had to provide a fair summary addressing causation, the proffered report did not satisfy the good faith effort to meet statutory requirements. Thus, the district court was required to grant HealthSouth's motion to dismiss for failure to provide an adequate expert report. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(e), (l). Accordingly, we overrule Kincaid's second issue.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly granted HealthSouth's motion to dismiss on the basis of either Lunday's lack of expert qualifications, or the inadequate treatment of causation in the expert report. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Kincaid's claim based on her failure to provide an adequate article 4590i expert report. The dismissal is affirmed.
Before Justices B. A. Smith, Patterson and Pemberton
Affirmed
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