 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Stafford v. Allstate Life Insurance Co.10/18/2005
int." The release is not limited to particular types of claims that resulted from the accident. Nor is it limited solely to claims that existed at the time the release was executed. The release covers all claims, based on any theory of recovery, accruing at any time in the past or future, that grow out of the accident. The release shows no intent to be limited in the manner which Stafford suggests. Absent any language of limitation, we cannot supply such a narrow interpretation.
The claims in Stafford's present lawsuit are based on actions taken by Allstate during the settlement negotiations and actions taken as a result of the settlement. The settlement negotiations and the settlement itself were a direct result of the automobile accident, i.e., they would not have occurred but for the accident. Therefore, Stafford's claims based on the settlement and settlement negotiations grew out of the accident. In fact, Stafford's own petition states, "Specifically, the claims arise out of the conduct in the underlying lawsuit filed in Jefferson County, Texas." The release bars any claims that grew out of the accident. Hence, the release contained in the settlement agreement bars Stafford's claims against all parties that were released.
(2) The Release Covers the Transaction Defendants
Though Stafford contends the release is applicable only to Allstate Insurance Company, we conclude the release is applicable to Allstate Insurance Company, Allstate Settlement Corporation, and Allstate Life Insurance Company---the Transaction Defendants.
A release discharges only those persons or entities that it names or specifically identifies. McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. 1971). One can claim the protection of a release only if the release refers to him or her by name or with such descriptive particularity that his or her identity or connection with the event is not in doubt. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex. 1984). "The McMillen requirement of specific identification is not met unless the reference in the release is so particular that a stranger could readily identify the released party." Id. at 419.
By its own language, the release signed by Stafford applies to any "subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, predecessors and successors in interest and assigns" of Allstate Insurance Company. Elsewhere in the settlement agreement and release, Allstate is given the right to assign its obligation to Allstate Settlement Corporation. Allstate is also given the right to purchase an annuity from Allstate Life Insurance Company.
Given their similar names and their inclusion within the settlement agreement itself, even a stranger to the transaction would have little trouble identifying Allstate Settlement Corporation and Allstate Life Insurance Corporation as affiliates of Allstate Insurance Company. Therefore, the release is applicable to both Allstate Life Insurance Corporation and Allstate Settlement Corporation, as well as Allstate Insurance Company.
(3) Stafford Has Alleged Sufficient Facts to Support Personal Standing as to the Nontransaction Defendants
The parties agree that the release is not applicable to any of the Nontransaction Defendants---Allstate Indemnity Company, Allstate County Mutual Insurance Company, Allstate Texas Lloyds, and Allstate Property and Casualty Company. The only question, then, is whether Stafford has pled sufficient facts to establish standing against those parties. We conclude she has.
Because standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction, we consider the plaintiffs' standing under the same standard by which we review subject-matter jurisdiction gen
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Texas Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|