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Texas Dep't of Transportation v. Pate8/16/2005
In the wake of the October 2000 collision that killed three young people---Earl Haley, Heather Anderson, and Casey Pate---at the intersection of State Highway 21 and Farm-to-Market Road 95 (FM95) in Nacogdoches County, the evidence suggested the pickup truck driven by Haley and occupied by his two companions either stopped or slowed to a crawl at a stop sign before proceeding slowly onto the highway and into the path of a tractor-trailer truck traveling just above the fifty-five-mile-per-hour speed limit. Evidence also showed that Haley's view of oncoming traffic on Highway 21 was at least partially obscured by vegetation that had grown up in the state highway right-of-way after the stop sign had been installed.
The survivors sued the Texas Department of Transportation (the Department) under a premises defect theory, alleging that the Department did not keep the trees at the intersection trimmed back enough to provide sufficient visibility so Haley, as he approached Highway 21 on FM95, could see and avoid oncoming traffic. The jury agreed, finding the Department sixty percent responsible and Haley forty percent responsible. The evidence shows that trees and underbrush had grown up in the sight lines from the stop bar, which was beside the stop sign thirty feet from the intersection, and that the truck would not have become visible to Haley until his vehicle was entering or was very near the intersection. The Department raises several issues on appeal.
We affirm the judgment because we hold that (A) sovereign immunity does not bar recovery; (B) the evidence is sufficient on the three challenged components of the jury's finding that the Department was negligent, (1) unreasonable risk of harm, (2) failure to warn of the condition, and (3) proximate cause; and (C) admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures was harmless error.
(A) Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar Recovery
The Department argues that it enjoys sovereign immunity because the Texas Tort Claims Act does not apply to this situation. We disagree.
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a governmental unit is not liable for the torts of its officers or agents in the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision waiving its immunity. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex. 2002); Dallas Co. Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1998). The Texas Tort Claims Act creates a limited waiver of this immunity in three general areas: "use of publicly owned automobiles, premises defects, and injuries arising out of conditions or use of property." Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 611 (Tex. 2000); see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021 (Vernon 2005). The Act does not waive immunity for discretionary decisions, such as whether and what type of safety features to provide or---as the Department asserts is applicable to this case---where to locate a warning sign. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.056 (Vernon 2005); State v. San Miguel, 2 S.W.3d 249, 251 (Tex. 1999).
The parties' views of this case diverge on this dividing point: whether the lawsuit is about the Department's decision on where to set the stop bar---a discretionary act involving safety features---or the Department's duty to maintain the right-of-way so growing vegetation did not create safety issues---a condition or use of the property.
The plaintiffs acknowledged at trial and on appeal that the Department had the authority to set the stop bar's location and that the Department's decision on that point was discretionary. The Department's argument assumes that the Department had the discretion to place the stop ba
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