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Hartless v. Allstate Texas Lloyds Insurance Co.12/6/2005
t, 109 S.W.3d at 866. We are to adopt the construction of an exclusionary clause urged by the insured so long as that construction is not unreasonable, even if the construction urged by the insurer appears to be more reasonable or a more accurate reflection of the parties' intent. Utica Nat'l Ins. Co., 141 S.W.3d at 202.
Ownership
It is clear from the summary judgment evidence that Tucker owned the aircraft. Allstate has made no argument to suggest how a personal injury could "arise from" his ownership of the aircraft, and we perceive no way in which that concept could be applied here. To suggest that simply because Tucker owned the aircraft, any personal injury in which the aircraft was implicated in any fashion was excluded does violence to the remaining portion of the exclusory clause. The Texas Supreme Court has held on several occasions that "arise out of" means that there is a causal connection or relation---a "but for" causation---though not necessarily direct or proximate causation. Id. at 203. There is no causal connection between Tucker's ownership of the airplane and the accident. Tucker could be liable for his negligent acts resulting in an accident which caused injuries to Hartless regardless of whether he owned the airplane. The trial court could not have properly rendered summary judgment on that basis.
Maintenance
Maintenance is one of the more clear-cut concepts involved in this phrase. Maintaining a device suggests that some action is being taken to keep it in operating condition, or to make it operable. In a discussion, the Texas Supreme Court has applied that term as encompassing the broader meaning involving the concept of supporting, sustaining, carrying on, and continuing in its purpose--even to the extent of including refueling a vehicle to keep it operable. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Ins. Co., 437 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. 1969).
Under any definition, there is no evidence to suggest that Tucker and Hartless were involved in maintaining the vehicle. It was inoperable, and there is nothing to indicate their actions had any purpose toward making it operable, either directly or indirectly---and the evidence shows directly to the contrary. The trial court could not properly render summary judgment on that basis.
Operation
"Operation" of the vehicle refers to doing or performing a practical work. LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. 1992); Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. 1989). As previously pointed out, the vehicle was not operable. The evidence shows conclusively that it was not doing any work of any sort, and the trial court could not render summary judgment on that basis.
Use
The Texas Supreme Court has recently discussed the term "use" in the context of an automobile insurance policy: " he use required is of the vehicle qua vehicle, rather than simply as an article of property. . . . f a vehicle is only the locational setting for an injury, the injury does not arise out of any use of the vehicle." Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex. 1999). Use means "to put . . . into action or service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose." LeLeaux, 835 S.W.2d at 51 (holding that injury did not arise from use of school bus and that bus was a mere situs for the injury); Lyons v. State Farm Lloyds and Nat'l Cas. Co., 41 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex. App.---Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
Thus, the phrase "arising from use" is treated as being a "general catchall . . . designed and construed to include all proper uses of the vehicle not falling within othe
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