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MacDonald v. Warner10/20/2005
[swept] far too broadly," the Texas Supreme Court observed that " he Act's definition of employee does not require that a governmental unit control every detail of a person's work." Id. The court noted that the summary judgment evidence showed that Murk practiced for UT as a member of its faculty, that he was compensated by UT, and that his medical decisions in the treatment of patients were subject to regimens prescribed by UT. Id. While recognizing that a physician was required to make medical decisions using professional judgment, the court held that the necessity for that judgment did not, by itself, vitiate UT's right to control the details of Murk's practice. Id.
Similarly, in Dalehite, the plaintiff argued that the defendant-physician was not a governmental employee covered by section 101.106 because UTMB, his employer, did not control the details of his diagnosis or treatment. 79 S.W.3d at 245--46. In reviewing the trial court's order granting summary judgment, the court noted that the physician had presented the trial court with undisputed evidence that he was a chairman of the UTMB department of neurosurgery, worked as a full-time professor at UTMB, treated patients and instructed medical students at UTMB, signed an employment contract with UTMB, and was paid a salary and provided benefits and insurance by UTMB. Id. at 245. Our sister court held that this evidence established that the physician was an employee of UTMB, and further held that the physician's exercise of discretion in diagnosing and treating patients did not make him an independent contractor. Id. at 245--46. Like the courts in Murk and Dalehite, we reject the argument that Warner and Castillo may not be characterized as employees under section 101.106 because they were required to exercise discretion and use independent judgment in making decisions concerning MacDonald's diagnosis and treatment.
Having held that Warner and Castillo established their affirmative defense under section 101.106 of the Act as a matter of law, we overrule MacDonald's first issue.
Conclusion
Having held that summary judgment was properly granted under section 101.106 of the Act, we need not address Macdonald's second issue. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Jennings, and Higley.
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