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Whittington v. City of Austin9/30/2005
st.] 2004, no pet.).
The longstanding rule in Texas condemnation cases has been that prejudgment interest begins to accrue on the date of the constitutional taking, the date the condemnor pays the amount of the special commissioners' award into the court's registry and gains the right to possess the property. Hale, 146 S.W.2d at 738; Texan Land & Cattle Co., 138 S.W.3d at 389; City of Austin v. Foster, 623 S.W.2d 672, 674-75 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Consistent with this rule, the trial court awarded the Whittingtons prejudgment interest accruing from January 24, 2002, the date the City deposited the amount of the special commissioners' award in the court registry and gained the right of possession pending further litigation. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.021.
The Whittingtons contend that prejudgment interest should instead accrue beginning on July 22, 2000, which they represent was 180 days after the City first sent them written notice of its intent to condemn the property. For this proposition, they rely on Johnson & Higgins of Texas, Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. 1998). In Johnson & Higgins, the Texas Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest awarded under "the common law" should conform to the statutory accrual and compounding formulas applicable to suits for wrongful death, personal injury , and property damages. Id. at 530-32. Under that statutory accrual formula, prejudgment interest generally begins to accrue "on the 180th day after the date the defendant receives written notice of a claim or on the date the suit is filed, whichever is earlier." Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 304.104 (West. Supp. 2004-05). While the rate and compounding method for prejudgment interest awards in condemnation cases is governed by a specific statute, see id. § 304.201 (West Supp. 2004-05), there is no statutory provision similarly addressing the accrual method for such awards. The Whittingtons deduce that the accrual of prejudgment interest awards in condemnation cases must be governed by the common law and, hence, Johnson & Higgins. We disagree.
In Texan Land & Cattle Co., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected a similar argument. It reasoned that (1) prejudgment interest in condemnation cases is based upon the constitutional requirement of adequate compensation, not the common law; and (2) consistent with this, the traditional accrual rule in condemnation cases is triggered by a constitutionally cognizable taking. 138 S.W.3d at 388-89. It contrasted this constitutional goal of adequate compensation with the statutory accrual concepts incorporated into the common law through Johnson & Higgins, which are a system of legislatively-crafted settlement incentives that do not necessarily yield adequate compensation. 138 S.W.3d at 388-89. Also, observing that Johnson & Higgins did not purport to overrule or limit the traditional accrual rule in Hale, the court concluded that " ithout additional guidelines from the supreme court, we follow Hale and its progeny." Id. at 389 n.5.
We find the reasoning of our sister court persuasive. Additionally, it is unclear to us how the statutory accrual scheme adopted by Johnson & Higgins could be applied within the hybrid civil action-administrative procedural framework of condemnation cases. See A Guide to Recent Changes and New Challenges in Texas Prejudgment Interest Law, 30 Tex. Tech L. Rev. at 117-18 (identifying practical problems and deducing that Johnson & Higgins is best construed as not extending to condemnation cases). We overrule the Whittingtons' second issue.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment th
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