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Pearson v. Lamb9/9/2005
For Official Publication
Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Thorne.
Suzanne J. Lamb (Defendant) appeals the trial court's denial of her motion for a new trial, in which she argued that the failure of Robert Pearson (Plaintiff) to comply with Utah Code section 38-1-11(4)(a) divested the trial court of jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4)(a) (2001). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In October 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking foreclosure of a mechanics' lien. Defendant filed her answer in December 2002 and an amended answer and counterclaim in February 2003; neither pleading contained allegations that Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of the Mechanics' Liens Act. On April 12, 2004, the parties filed stipulations of fact with the district court, stipulating that
Mr. Pearson has complied with all the statutory procedural requirements for perfecting and foreclosing on a mechanics' lien . . . ; Mrs. Lamb does not defend against Mr. Pearson's mechanics' lien claim on these statutory procedural grounds, but simply challenges his right to receive payment of the amounts claimed in the lien.
A bench trial was held thereafter, and the district court entered a memorandum decision in favor of Plaintiff on April 20, 2004.
On May 26, 2004, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration (which she now dubs a motion for a new trial), in which she argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the foreclosure action because Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of section 38-1-11(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Liens Act. The trial court, on June 16, 2004, issued a ruling and order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, and on July 28, 2004, entered a Final Order and Judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The only issue before this court is whether Plaintiff's failure to comply with section 38-1-11(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Liens Act divested the trial court of jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's mechanics' lien foreclosure action. If Plaintiff's failure to comply with section 38-1-11(4)(a) did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction, it is undisputed that Defendant waived that issue, not only by failing to assert it prior to trial but also by stipulation.
The determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court's determination. See Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, , 31 P.3d 1147. Questions of statutory interpretation are similarly questions of law that are reviewed "for correctness, giving no deference to the district court's interpretation." Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, , 94 P.3d 234.
ANALYSIS
Under section 38-1-11(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Liens Act, lien claimants filing an action to enforce a lien must serve on the defendant-owner of a residence instructions relating to the owner's rights and a form affidavit along with the complaint. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4)(a) (2001). Pursuant to section 38-1-11(4)(e), " f a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the instructions and form affidavit required by ubsection 4(a), the lien claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the residence." Id. § 38-1-11(4)(e). On appeal, Defendant argues that the language of section 38-1-11(4)(e) makes subsection 4(a) "mandatory," thereby making it a jurisdictional provision that cannot be waived and can be raised at any time. Defendant thus contends that Plaintiff's failure to comply with requirements of section 38-1-11(4)(a) deprive
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