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Gettis v. Green Mountain Economic Development Corp.10/28/2005
t we did not reach the issue. Id.
25. We need not determine whether we would adopt the continuing tort doctrine to determine statute-of-limitations accrual outside of discrimination cases because it would not help plaintiffs in this case. The continuing tort doctrine requires at least two elements: a continuing wrong, and some action contributing to the wrong that occurred within the limitations period. Even if plaintiffs are correct that defendants' actions could be considered to be a continuing wrong, we can find no part of that wrong that occurred in the limitations period.
26. Plaintiffs allege the following actions in an effort to demonstrate that defendants engaged in an "ongoing pattern of tortious conduct," which caused plaintiffs' personal injuries:
- December 10, 1996: Defendants closed on plaintiffs' loans before the required permits were secured.
- January 1997: The GMEDC loan administrator advised plaintiffs to purchase business equipment with personal credit cards, and assured them that a lower-interest loan would be available that would relieve them of the high-interest credit card debt.
- March 27, 1997: The loan administrator informed plaintiffs that GMEDC would not provide plaintiffs with a loan to consolidate their credit card debt. She suggested that funds might be available in six months, but that in the meantime they should restructure the ownership of the business and solicit credit denials from other lenders.
- October 3, 1997: Mr. Gettis met with the loan administrator and SBA advisor, both as GMEDC representatives, who informed him that no additional loan funds would be provided under the existing loans and plaintiffs would have to begin the application process again if they sought additional loans.
- October 1, 1998: GMEDC executive director met with plaintiffs and was "furious" about their use of credit cards. He agreed to allow plaintiffs to make interest-only payments over the winter.
- November 3, 1998: The executive director sent a letter informing plaintiffs that they were required to bring their loans current before they could commence interest-only payments.
- December 1, 1998: Appellees sent default letters to plaintiffs, demanding payment of the loans in full within fifteen days-that is, before December 16, 1998.
The only act plaintiffs can point to within the limitations period is the expiration of the fifteen-day redemption period-or grace period, as plaintiffs characterize it-to cure the loan default. Plaintiffs contend that during this time defendants could have discontinued the default declaration or provided plaintiffs with an alternate means of meeting their obligations.
27. Nothing in the factual statements indicates that defendants took any action to collect on the loan obligations after plaintiffs defaulted. The complaint states that since plaintiffs had no "other financial options," they "regrettably shut their business down." In their supplemental statement of material facts, plaintiffs asserted that at no time after the default letter did any representative of defendants contact plaintiffs "to discuss their situation." The complaint goes on to state that plaintiffs were forced to file for bankruptcy and "also surrendered possession of the restaurant equipment and other property purchased with their personal credit cards." Consistent with that allegation, plaintiffs' supplemental statement of material facts states that after plaintiffs' delicatessen closed, defendants did not repossess any of the collateral and received no further payments on their loans.
28. The continuing tort doctrine requires t
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