 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Willard v. Parsons Hill Partnership8/5/2005
ad received several written notices of the water problem from the State over a fourteen-year period, the trial court ruled that the Poulins' failure to give the partnership written notice of the alleged habitability defect pursuant to § 4458 barred their claim. The court stated that " abitability issues only become relevant when the defects, patent or latent, come to light," regardless of how long the landlords had known of and failed to repair them, apparently concluding that notice from the State to the partnership was not sufficient to bring the defect "to light."
11. Even though the Willards also brought their claim under the common law, the trial court credited them for complying with the statute's notice requirement. Nonetheless, the court concluded that they could not prevail because they could not show that defendants "fail to make repairs within a reasonable time," or that the contaminated water system "materially affect the health and safety" of the tenants. The court based its conclusions on its view that the reasonable time in which defendants were required to make repairs was measured from August 1997 when the Willards gave written notice of the water defect, instead of 1983 when Yvonne Rooney received written notice of the PCE contamination from the Department of Health. The court concluded that defendants had remedied the habitability defect within a reasonable time because the undisputed facts showed that, within weeks of the Willards' letter, the State "was promptly on the scene with a . . . [water tank] for drinking and cooking water." In light of the short period between the tenants' notice letter and defendants' remedial action, the court concluded that "it cannot be said that the contaminated water system 'materially affect health and safety,' " even though plaintiffs alleged that they had been drinking PCE-contaminated water for many years.
12. We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. In so doing, we apply the same standard as the trial court, granting summary judgment if there are no genuine issues as to any material fact, and any party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3). Our review of legal questions presented by the motion is plenary and nondeferential.
I. Warranty of Habitability
13. The principal issue is whether plaintiffs may rely on the common-law implied warranty of habitability we recognized in Hilder v. St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984), or whether the common law as stated therein was preempted by the Legislature's enactment of the Residential Rental Agreements Act, 9 V.S.A. §§ 4451-4468. We agree with plaintiffs that the statute as originally enacted covered only patent defects, and that to apply its notice provisions to bar plaintiffs' claim based on latent defects is illogical. Moreover, there is no evidence in the statute or legislative history that the Legislature intended to change the common-law with respect to latent defects, or to preempt that law as stated in Hilder.
14. In Hilder, we concluded that changes in the historical relationship between landlords and tenants necessitated the adoption of an implied requirement, in every residential rental agreement, that the landlord maintain premises that are at all times safe, clean, and fit for human habitation. 144 Vt. at 159, 478 A.2d at 208. We recognized that because of their greater familiarity with the rental units they own and the essential equipment attached to those units, landlords were in a superior position to discover and cure any defects that would affect the safety and fitness for human habitation of their units. Id. at 158, 478 A.2d at 207. We stressed that the warranty of habitab
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Vermont Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|