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McKee v. Martin12/13/2005
In this personal injury action, Ulysses Martin appeals the trial court's summary judgment ruling that he is collaterally estopped from presenting evidence to show that he did not disobey a traffic control device in violation of RCW 46.61.050. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
On May 22, 2002, a school bus driven by Colin McKee collided with a car driven by Ulysses Martin at a traffic light controlled intersection. McKee declared that he approached the intersection traveling westbound and determined that it would be safe to proceed through the intersection. When McKee reached the intersection, the traffic light turned yellow.
Determining that it would be unsafe to stop, McKee proceeded through the intersection.
Martin was traveling northbound. He stated that when he first saw the traffic light, it was red, but that it turned green as he approached the intersection. Martin then proceeded through the intersection. Martin saw the school bus driven by McKee 'bearing down as if to stop at the intersection.' Clerk's Papers (CP) at 76. When the bus did not stop, Martin accelerated through the intersection in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid a collision.
Police cited Martin for disobeying a traffic signal in violation of RCW 46.61.050 by entering the intersection when the light was red. On July 22, 2002, Martin contested the traffic citation and hired an attorney to represent him in the hearing in Tacoma Municipal Court. Witnesses testified for both sides. The commissioner found that Martin had committed the infraction and imposed a $133 fine.
On July 25, 2002, McKee sued Martin for damages arising from the collision. McKee moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order estopping Martin from contesting liability because of the municipal court's finding that he committed the infraction. In response to McKee's summary judgment motion, two witnesses filed declarations supporting Martin's assertion that he did not disobey the traffic light. Theresa Dills, heading eastbound, saw the traffic light turn red as she approached the intersection. As she stopped at the red light, she saw McKee's school bus enter the intersection from the opposite direction without stopping, apparently trying to make a right turn to head northbound. Dills opined that, based on her experience at that intersection, McKee's westbound traffic light must have been red because the eastbound and westbound lights are coordinated.
George Crocker, who was also familiar with the light sequence at the intersection, had been stopped at the intersection for some time because his light was red. While facing southbound, he noticed McKee approach the intersection. Crocker saw McKee looking up toward the light as he approached, believing that McKee accelerated in an attempt 'to beat the light.' CP at 35. Crocker heard, but did not see, the collision; a moment after he heard the collision, he noticed that the southbound traffic light was green.
The trial court granted McKee's motion for partial summary judgment and ordered that Martin 'is collaterally estopped from arguing or presenting evidence that he did not violate RCW 46.61.050, disobey{ing} a traffic control device.' CP at 79. The court did not, however, preclude Martin from contesting liability in the personal injury action.
We granted discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b)(2).
ANALYSIS
We review summary judgment orders de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 860, 93 P.3d 108 (2004) (citing Kruse v. Hemp, 121 Wn.2d 715, 722, 853 P.2d 1373 (1993)). Summary judgment i
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