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State v. Slert8/9/2005
ithout a lawyer is subject to further interrogation.' Aten, 130 Wn.2d at 666 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed. 2d 378 (1981)) (emphasis added).
Here, Slert's suppression arguments are unpersuasive. Regarding his statement to law enforcement in the patrol car, the trial court found that Slert voluntarily initiated his statements. Indeed, McCrosky did not actively engage Slert in conversation or encourage his statements. Nothing in the record contradicts the court's finding that his statements were voluntary.
Slert's taped statement while at the jail was clearly made after he waived his Miranda rights. Slert made his taped statement following additional Miranda warnings given approximately six hours after police questioned him at the crime scene. Slert's taped statement waived his right to an attorney and the right to remain silent.
In response to this evidence, Slert asserts that his two statements were due to Detective Wetzold's request for clarification of Slert's statements after Slert invoked his Miranda rights and following Detective Wetzold's inspection of the crime scene. Slert contends that police did not scrupulously honor his invocation of Miranda. But Slert initiated his statements in the patrol car with a different officer and the officer testified that he did not initiate a conversation with Slert, nor did he question him. Furthermore, Slert does not assert that the officer questioned him or initiated any conversation in the car. And the taped statement was approximately six hours after he left the crime scene where he had refused to talk further with Detective Wetzold and followed his waiver of Miranda warnings given at the jail.
Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting the two challenged statements.
IV. Rule of Completeness
Slert argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not allow the park ranger to testify about Slert's statements to him. Slert argues that his hearsay statements to the park ranger provided necessary context and clarify that (1) Slert felt afraid for his life because of Benson's conduct; and (2) he did not immediately report the incident because he was too drunk at the time.
We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion; abuse occurs only if the ruling was 'manifestly unreasonable' or based on 'untenable grounds.' State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792, 810, 975 P.2d 967 (1999). Slert bears the burden of proving abuse of discretion. State v. Demery, 144 Wn.2d 753, 758, 30 P.3d 1278 (2001).
ER 106 provides that when a 'recorded statement . . . is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the party at that time to introduce any other part, or any other writing or recorded statement, which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.' The court should allow testimony under the rule of completeness when it would provide context to the admitted evidence and avoid misleading the jury. State v. Larry, 108 Wn. App. 894, 910, 34 P.3d 241 (2001).
Here, Slert fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its broad discretion. The jury heard extensive testimony regarding Slert's justifiable homicide theory and that he felt Benson's conduct was life-threatening. Similarly, the jury heard Slert's admissible tape recorded statement that he did not immediately contact law enforcement because Benson's CB radio did not work, he was 'buzzed' and dazed and confused, and eventually fell asleep. CP at 26. The ranger's testimony recounting Slert's statements to him would not provide further guidance or context on these issues.
Thus, the trial court did not abuse i
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